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SUMMARY
A scenario where multiple entities interact with a common environment to achieve
individual and common goals either co-operatively or competitively can be classified as a
Multi-Agent System. In this thesis, we concentrate on the situations where the agents exhibit
selfish, competitive and strategic behaviour, giving rise to interesting game theoretic and
optimization problems. From a computational point of view, the presence of multiple agents
introduces strategic and temporal issues, apart from enhancing the difficulty of optimization.
We study natural mathematical models of such multi-agent problems faced in practice.
We provide approximation algorithms, online algorithms and hardness of approximation re-
sults for these problems.
Multi-Agent Submodular Covering Problems. Classical covering problems such as
minimum spanning tree, vertex cover and shortest path have been widely used to model a
variety of practical situations where the goal is to minimize the cost of a project. However,
typically these abstractions do not model two properties commonly observed in the real-
world problems: 1) Cost functions observed in practice often exhibit economies of scale and
2) Presence of multiple providers or agents each of whom may have different cost function
over the same set of objects. The question in general is: How can we incorporate these
layers of complexity into combinatorial covering problems?
Submodular functions is a rich and well-studied class of functions used to model economies
of scale, or the law of diminishing returns. With this background, we introduce the following
class of combinatorial problems with multi-agent submodular cost functions - We are given a
set of elements X and a collection C ⊆ 2X . There are m agents and every agent i specifies
a normalized monotone submodular cost function fi : 2X → R+. The goal is to find a set
S ∈ C and a partition S1, ..., Sm of S such that
∑
i fi(Si) is minimized. The collection C of
subsets of X is defined via a combinatorial structure such as a matroid or a graph property
x
(For example, C can consists of the set of all s-t paths in a graph, yielding a version of the
shortest path problem).
We study the following fundamental problems under this multi-agent submodular cost
setting: Combinatorial reverse auction, vertex cover, shortest path, minimum spanning tree
and minimum perfect matching. We study the approximability of these problems with both
algorithmic and hardness results, i.e., upper and lower bounds on the approximation factors.
Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations. A central problem in
computational mechanism design is that of combinatorial auctions, in which an auctioneer
wants to sell a heterogeneous set of items J to interested agents. Each agent i has a valuation
function fi(.) which describes her valuation fi(S) for every set S ⊆ J of items. We consider
the case when some inherent property of the items induces a common and publicly known
partial information about the valuation function of the buyers. In particular, we consider
combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent i for a set S of items can be expressed
as vif(S), where vi is a private single parameter of the agent, and the function f is publicly
known. The goal is to design a truthful mechanism which maximizes the social welfare∑
i vif(Si), where S1 · · ·Sn is a partition of J .
Our motivation behind studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions
arise naturally in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. For
an ad shown in a set S of ad-slots, f(S) is, say, the number of unique viewers reached by
the ad, and vi is the valuation per-unique-viewer. (b) From a theoretical point of view,
this factorization of the valuation function simplifies the bidding language, and renders the
combinatorial auction more amenable to better approximation factors.
We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts
any α-approximation non-truthful algorithm (α ≤ 1) for this problem into Ω( αlogn) and
Ω(α)-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial
time, respectively.
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Online Vertex-weighted Bipartite Matching and Single-Bid Budgeted Alloca-
tions. Online bipartite matching is a fundamental problem with numerous applications
such as matching candidates to jobs or boys to girls. More recently, this and related prob-
lems have received significant attention, because they model the allocation aspect of spon-
sored search auctions, where multiple agents (advertisers) bid on items (query keywords)
which arrive one by one in an online manner. We study the following vertex-weighted on-
line bipartite matching problem: G(U, V,E) is a bipartite graph. The vertices in U have
weights and are known ahead of time, while the vertices in V arrive online in an arbitrary
order and have to be matched upon arrival. The goal is to maximize the sum of weights
of the matched vertices in U . When all the weights are equal, this reduces to the classic
online bipartite matching problem for which Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani gave an optimal(
1− 1e
)
-competitive algorithm in their seminal work [38].




-competitive randomized algorithm for general
vertex weights. Our solution constitutes the first known generalization of the algorithm
in [38] in this model and provides new insights into the role of randomization in online
allocation problems. It also effectively solves the problem of online budgeted allocations
[47] in the case when an agent makes the same bid for any desired item, even if the bid is
comparable to his budget - complementing the results of [47, 11] which apply when the bids




A scenario where multiple entities interact with a common environment to achieve individual
and common goals either co-operatively or competitively can be classified as a Multi-Agent
System. In this thesis, we will concentrate on the situations where the agents exhibit selfish,
competitive and strategic behaviour, giving rise to interesting game theoretic and optimiza-
tion problems.
As communication between entities becomes easier, the number of interested parties in
any transaction or event is increasing. The rise of the internet, in particular, has catalysed
the study of computational problems in multi-agent systems in recent years. We consider
natural mathematical models of such multi-agent problems faced in practice. These prob-
lems exhibit salient aspects which we outline below, and we study these various aspects in
Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
First and foremost, the presence of multiple agents in a system leads to a larger number
of possible outcomes or solutions to choose from. In a typical optimization scenario, such
as minimizing the cost of a project, this makes it possible to construct a cheaper or better
solution, but the difficulty of finding the best solution obviously increases. We attempt to
characterize this effect in the case of some fundamental optimization problems in Chapter
2.
In large multi-agent systems such as the internet, more often than not it is the case that
the agents act selfishly, i.e. in their own interest. Since the input of the computational prob-
lem consists of values reported by various agents, we have to deal with strategic behaviour of
the agents, who may report untrue values if they have an incentive to do so in terms of the
final outcome. Therefore, even an optimal solution computed using the reported values may
be far from optimal on the true values. This interplay between optimization and strategic
behaviour is studied in the field of mechanism design. In Chapter 3, we study a mechanism
1
design problem motivated by advertising on broadcast media such as television and radio.
Finally, all the agents in a system may not be active at the same time. This temporal
aspect is studied in the field of online algorithms, wherein only a part of the input is available
to the algorithm at any given moment. We study an online allocation problem, motivated
by display advertising on the internet, in Chapter 4.
We provide an introduction to the problems studied in this thesis here followed by a
more detailed exposition in the respective chapters.
1.1 Multi-Agent Submodular Covering Problems
A multitude of fundamental computational problems with real-world applications can be
cast in the following framework: We are given a set X of elements, a collection C of subsets
of X (i.e. C ⊆ 2X) and a cost function f over the subsets of X. The collection C is typically
specified via a combinatorial structure like a matroid or a graph property (for instance, the
set of all spanning trees in a graph). The objective is to select a set S ∈ C that minimizes
f(S).
A major focus in theoretical computer science has been on linear cost functions. However,
linear cost functions do not always model the complex dependencies of the costs in the real-
world, such as the widely observed economies of scale. As a result, even though we might
have a good algorithm for solving some linear optimization problem, the output solution can
still be suboptimal. Therefore, it is important to extend the study of classical optimization
problems to more general cost functions. In this work, we concentrate on submodular cost
functions, as they form a rich class and capture the natural properties of economies of scale
or the law of diminishing returns.
Another feature that arises in practice is the presence of multiple agents, where each
agent has her own cost function. Thus, in the optimal solution, each agent might build
only a part of the required combinatorial structure. For example, the Internet is a complex
multi-agent system where each service provider owns only a part of the network. For linear
cost functions, it is easy to see that having multiple agents does not change the complexity
of the original problem. However, this is not the case for more general cost functions and in
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particular, for submodular cost functions.
Motivated by these considerations, we define the following class of combinatorial problems
with multi-agent submodular cost functions (MSCP) - We are given a set of elements X and
a collection C ⊆ 2X . There are m agents, and each agent i specifies a normalized monotone
submodular cost function fi : 2X → R+. We assume a value oracle model wherein the oracle
returns the value fi(S) of the set S when queried with S and i. The goal is to find a set
S ∈ C and a partition S1, ..., Sm of S such that
∑
i fi(Si) is minimized.
By fixing the collection C to any particular combinatorial structure, one can define a
subclass of the problems of interest. In this contribution, we study the following fundamental
problems in MSCP :
• Combinatorial Reverse Auction (CRA): We are given a set X of elements and
the collection C consists of only the set X i.e. in the required solution all the elements
must be covered. This models the situation where a set of jobs needs to be assigned
to multiple workers.
• Submodular Vertex Cover (MS-VC): We are given an undirected graph G(V,E).
Element set X is the same as the set of vertices V and the collection C consists of all
the vertex covers of the graph. Recall that a set S ⊆ V is a vertex cover if every e ∈ E
is incident on a vertex in S.
• Submodular Shortest Path (MS-SP): We are given a connected undirected graph
G(V,E), and a pair of vertices s, t ∈ V . Element set X is the same as the set of edges
E and the collection C consists of all the paths from s to t.
• Submodular Minimum Perfect Matchings (MS-MPM): We have a undirected
graph G = (V,E) with cost functions over E. G contains at least one perfect matching.
Element set X is the set of all edges, and the collection C is defined as the set of all
perfect matchings of G. Recall that a set M ⊆ E is a perfect matching of G if exactly
one edge in M is incident on every vertex.
• Submodular Minimum Spanning Tree (MS-MST): We are given a connected
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undirected graph G = (V,E) with cost functions over E. Element set X is the set of
all edges, and the collection C is the set of spanning trees of G. Recall that a spanning
tree is a minimal connected subgraph of G.
We study the approximability of these problems with both algorithmic and hardness re-
sults, i.e., upper and lower bounds on the approximation factors. These results are tabulated
in Section 1.4.1.
1.2 Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
A central problem in computational mechanism design is that of combinatorial auctions, in
which an auctioneer wants to sell a heterogeneous set of items J to interested agents. Each
agent i has a valuation function fi(.) which describes her valuation fi(S) for every set S ⊆ J
of items. In its most general form, the entire valuation function is assumed to be private
information which may not be revealed truthfully by the agents. Maximizing the social
welfare in a combinatorial auction with an incentive-compatible mechanism is an important
open problem. However, recent results [18, 12] have established polynomial lower bounds
on the approximation ratio of maximal-in-range mechanisms - which account for a majority
of positive results in mechanism design - even when all the valuations are assumed to be
submodular. On the other hand, in the non-game-theoretic case, if all the agents’ valuations
are public knowledge and hence truthfully known, then we can maximize the social welfare
to much better factors [19, 20, 59], under varying degree of restrictions on the valuations.
In this section, we introduce a model that lies in between these two extremes.
We explore the setting when some inherent property of the items induces a common
and publicly known partial information about the valuation function of the agents. For
instance, in position auctions in sponsored search, the agents’ valuation for a position consists
of a private value-per-click as well as a public click-through rate, that is known to the
auctioneer. Another situation where such private/public factorization of valuations arises
is advertisements in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. Suppose we are selling
TV ad-slots on a television network. There are m ad-slots and n advertisers interested in
them. Let us define a function f : 2[m] → Z+, such that for any set S of ad-slots f(S) is the
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number of unique viewers who will see the ad if the ad is shown on each slot in S1. If an
advertiser i is willing to pay vi dollars per unique viewer reached by her ad, then her total
valuation of the set S is vif(S).
With this background, we define single parameter combinatorial auctions with partially
public valuations: We are given a set J of m items and a global public valuation function
f : 2J → R. The function f can either be specified explicitly or via an oracle which takes
a set S as input and returns f(S). In addition, we have n agents each of whom has a private
multiplier vi such that the item set S provides vif(S) amount of utility to agent i. The goal
is to design a truthful mechanism which maximizes
∑
i vif(Si), where S1 · · ·Sn is a partition
of J .
One can think of this model as combinatorial auctions with simplified bidding language.
The agents only need to specify one parameter vi as their bid. Moreover, our problem has
deeper theoretical connections to the area of single parameter mechanism design in general.
For single parameter domains such as ours, it is known that monotone allocation rules
characterize the set of all truthful mechanisms. An allocation rule or algorithm is said to
be monotone if the allocation parameter of an agent (f(Si) in our case) is non-decreasing in
his reported bid vi. Unfortunately, often it is the case that good approximation algorithms
known for a given class of valuation functions are not monotonic. It is an important and
well-known open question in algorithmic mechanism design to resolve whether the design
of monotone algorithms is fundamentally harder than the non-monotone ones. In other
words, it is not known if, for single parameter problems, we can always convert any α-
approximation algorithm into a truthful mechanism with the same factor. We believe that
our problem is a suitable candidate to attack this question as it gives a lot of flexibility in
defining the complexity of function f . From this discussion, it follows that the only lower
bound known for the approximation factor of a truthful mechanism in our setting is the
hardness of approximation of the underlying optimization problem.
1For a single ad-slot j, the function f({j}) is nothing but the television rating for that slot as computed
by rating agencies such as Nielsen. In fact, their data collection through set-top boxes results in a TV
slot-viewer bipartite graph on the sample population, from which f(S) can be estimated for any set S of ad
slots.
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We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that con-
verts any black-box α-approximation non-truthful algorithm (α ≤ 1) for this problem into
Ω( αlogn) and Ω(α)-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-
polynomial time, respectively. It is important to note that we do not make any explicit as-
sumptions such as non-negativity or free disposal about the public function f . The black-box
algorithm - which is an input - may make some implicit assumptions about f .
1.3 Online Vertex-weighted Bipartite Matching and Single-Bid Budgeted
Allocations
Online bipartite matching is a fundamental problem with numerous applications such as
matching candidates to jobs or boys to girls. More recently, this and related problems have
received significant attention, because they model the allocation aspect of sponsored search
auctions, where multiple agents (advertisers) bid on items (query keywords) which arrive
one by one in an online manner. A canonical result in online bipartite matching is due to
Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani [38], who gave an optimal online algorithm for the unweighted
case to maximize the size of the matching. In their model, we are given a bipartite graph
G(U, V,E). The vertices in U are known ahead of time, while the vertices in V arrive one
at a time online in an arbitrary order. When a vertex in V arrives, the edges incident to it
are revealed and it can be matched to a neighboring vertex in U that has not already been
matched. A match once made cannot be revoked. The goal is to maximize the number of
matched vertices.
However, in many real world scenarios, the value received from matching a vertex might
be different for different vertices: (1) Advertisers in online display ad-campaigns are willing
to pay a fixed amount every time their graphic ad is shown on a website. By specifying their
targeting criteria, they can choose the set of websites they are interested in. Each impression
of an ad can be thought of as matching the impression to the advertiser, collecting revenue
equal to the advertiser’s bid. (2) Consider the sale of an inventory of items such as cars.
Buyers arrive in an online manner looking to purchase one out of a specified set of items
they are interested in. The sale of an item generates revenue equal to the price of the item.
The goal in both these cases is to maximize the total revenue.
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With this background, we define Online Vertex-weighted Bipartite Matching : The input
instance is a bipartite graph G(U, V,E, {bu}u∈U ), with the vertices in U and their weights
bu known ahead of time. Vertices in V arrive one at a time, online, revealing their incident
edges. An arriving vertex can be matched to an unmatched neighbor upon arrival. Matches
once made cannot be revoked later and a vertex left unmatched upon arrival cannot be
matched later. The goal is to maximize the sum of the weights of the matched vertices in
U .




-competitive randomized algorithm for this prob-
lem. Our solution constitutes the first known generalization of the algorithm in [38] in this
model and provides new insights into the role of randomization in online allocation problems.
This result also constitutes a step towards the solution of the online budgeted allocation
problem. This problem was first considered by Mehta et al [47] to model the sponsored
search auctions: We have n agents and m items. Each agent i specifies a monetary budget
Bi and a bid bij for each item j. Items arrive online, and must be immediately allocated
to an agent. If a set S of items is allocated to agent i, then the agent pays the minimum
of Bi and
∑
j∈S bij . The objective is to maximize the total revenue of the algorithm. An
important and unsolved restricted case of this problem is when all the non-zero bids of an
agent are equal, i.e. bij = bi or 0 for all j. Our result effectively solves this case, since it
reduces to our vertex-weighted matching problem.
For the general online budgeted allocation problem, no factor better than 12 (achieved
by a simple deterministic greedy algorithm [45]) is yet known. The best known lower bound
stands at 1− 1e due to the hardness result in [38] for the case when all bids and budgets are
equal to 1 - which is equivalent to the unweighted online matching problem. The small bids
case - where bij  Bi for all i and j - was solved by [47, 11] achieving the optimal 1 − 1e
deterministic competitive ratio. It was believed that handling large bids requires the use of
randomization, as in [38], but no generalization of that result was known prior to our work.
Our solution to the vertex-weighted matching problem is a significant step in this di-
rection. Our algorithm generalizes that of [38] and provides new insights into the role of
randomization in these solutions. Finally, our algorithm has interesting connections to the
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solution of [47] for the small bids case - despite the fact that the vertex-weighted matching
problem is neither harder nor easier than the small bids case. This strongly suggests a
possible unified approach to the unrestricted online budgeted allocation problem.
1.4 Contributions, Credits and Organization of the Thesis
1.4.1 Multi-Agent Submodular Covering Problems
In a joint paper with Gagan Goel, Pushkar Tripathi and Lei Wang [25], we gave an approxi-
mation algorithm and a matching information theoretic lower bound for each of the subclass
of problems2 that we mentioned in section 1.1. In case of shortest path, minimum spanning
tree and minimum perfect matching problems, the bounds established are polynomial and
tight upto poly-logarithmic factors. Ignoring these logarithmic factors, we present these
results in the table below (Refer to Chapter 2 for proofs). For the reverse auction problem,
m is the number of agents and n is the number of items, whereas for all other problems, n
is the number of vertices in the instance graph.
Single-Agent Multi-Agent
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Reverse Auction 1 1 Ω(log n) min(m, log n) [30]
Vertex Cover 2− ε 2 Ω(log n) 2 log n
Shortest Path Ω(n2/3) O(n2/3) Ω(n2/3) O(n)
Perfect Matching Ω(n) n Ω(n) n
Spanning Tree Ω(n) n Ω(n) n
Note that the minimum perfect matching and minimum spanning tree problems, which
are polynomial time solvable with linear cost functions, have a large hardness factor with
submodular cost functions. We would like to draw attention to our lower bound result for
the vertex cover problem in the single agent case. In the classical vertex cover problem, the
best known approximation factor is 2, and the best known hardness of approximation is
1.3606 (assuming P 6= NP ) [16]. Khot et al. [41] showed that achieving a factor of 2 − ε
2With the exception of the multi-agent submodular shortest path problem. We comment on this aberra-
tion in Section 2.5.2.
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‘might be’ hard by presenting a hardness result based on UGC conjecture [39]. Our results
for the single agent submodular vertex cover problem implies that, if the cost function over
the set of vertices is submodular, then the optimal approximation factor is indeed 2.
Our hardness results use information theoretic arguments. Our algorithms are based on
LP rounding or greedy methods.
We would like to point out that our results for perfect matchings and spanning trees
extend to the class of subadditive cost functions, and to related combinatorial structures
such as Steiner trees.
Remark: Part of this work also appeared in the PhD thesis of Gagan Goel. Independent
of our work, Iwata and Nagano [35] also gave factor 2 approximation algorithm for the single
agent submodular vertex cover. They also study submodular cost set cover and submodular
edge cover problem.
1.4.2 Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
In a joint paper with Gagan Goel and Lei Wang [26], we presented a general vector fitting
technique for designing truthful mechanisms for single parameter combinatorial auctions
with partially public valuations. Our main result is a black-box reduction, which accepts any
(possibly non-truthful) α-approximation algorithm for our problem as a black-box and uses





. We also give




. Both these results
are corollaries obtained by setting parameters appropriately in Theorem 14 in Chapter 3
to achieve desired trade-off between the approximation factor and the running time. Our
results can also be interpreted as converting non-monotone algorithms into monotone ones
for the above model.
Our mechanisms are maximal-in-range, i.e., they fix a range R of allocations and com-
pute the allocation S ∈ R that maximizes the social welfare. The technical core of our work
lies in careful construction of this range.
While the black-box algorithm may be randomized, our mechanism does not introduce
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any further randomization. Depending upon whether the black-box algorithm is deter-
ministic or randomized, our mechanism is deterministically truthful or universally truthful
respectively (See Section 3.2 for definitions). The approximation factor of our mechanism
is deterministic (or with high probability or in expectation) if the black-box algorithm also
provides the approximation guarantees deterministically (or with high probability or in ex-
pectation).
Note that we don’t need to worry about how the public valuation function f is specified.
This is plausible since the function is accessed only from within the black-box algorithm.
Hence, our mechanism can be applied to any model of specification - whether it is specified
explicitly or through a value or demand oracle - using the corresponding approximation
algorithm from that model.
Submodular valuations arise naturally in practice from economies of scale or the law of
diminishing returns. Hence, we make a special note of our results when the public valuation
is submodular. Using the algorithm of [59] as black-box, our results imply a Ω (1/ log n) and
Ω(1) approximation factors in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time, respectively. In
Appendix A.1, we prove with a simple example that the standard greedy algorithm for
submodular welfare maximization is not monotone and hence, not truthful. Similarly, the
optimal approximation algorithm of [59] is also not known to be non-monotone. For entirely
private submodular valuations, the best known truthful mechanism has factor Ω(1/
√
m)
in the value oracle model [19] and Ω(logm log logm) in the demand oracle model [17].
Note that the former mechanism is deterministically truthful while the latter is universally
truthful.
1.4.3 Online Vertex-weighted Bipartite Matching and Single-Bid Budgeted Al-
locations
In a joint paper with Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel and Aranyak Mehta [1], we presented





-competitive in expectation. Our result constitutes the first known general-
ization of the Ranking algorithm for the unweighted case given by Karp, Vazirani and
Vazirani [38] in their seminal work.
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Our algorithm, which we call Perturbed-Greedy (Refer to Chapter 4), is surprisingly
simple to state. The crux of our work lies in a careful counting argument in the probability
space, where we bound the weight of bad events (occurrence of a matched vertex) by the
weight of the good events (occurrence of an unmatched vertex). Perturbed-Greedy and
its analysis provides new insights into the role of randomization in online allocation problems,
which is important from the point of view of solving more general problems, viz. the online
budgeted allocation problem.
As we prove in Section 4.5.3, the single bids case of the online budgeted allocation
problem reduces to our vertex-weighted matching problem. Therefore our result effectively
solves this case, taking a step towards the solution of the general online budgeted allocation
problem. Our solution to the single bids case - when all the bids of an agent are equal -
has a very interesting ‘interface’ with the algorithm of Mehta et al [47] for the small bids
case - when all the bids of an agent are very small compared to his budget. This strongly
suggests a possible unified approach to the unrestricted online budgeted allocation problem.
We elaborate on these implications of our result in Section 4.5.
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CHAPTER II
MULTI-AGENT SUBMODULAR COVERING PROBLEMS
In this chapter, we introduce and study combinatorial problems with multi-agent submod-
ular cost functions. We establish upper and lower bound on the approximability of these
problems.
Combinatorial problems with multi-agent submodular costs (MSCP):
We are given a set of elements X and a collection C ⊆ 2X . There are m agents, and each
agent i specifies a normalized monotone submodular cost function fi : 2X → R+. The goal
is to find a set S ∈ C and a partition S1, ..., Sm of S such that
∑
i fi(Si) is minimized.
A function f : 2X → R+ is said to be submodular iff for any two sets S and T ⊆ X,
f(S) + f(T ) ≥ f(S ∪ T ) + f(S ∩ T ). Function f is said to be monotone if f(S) ≤ f(T )
for any S ⊆ T , and normalized if f(∅) = 0. Since a submodular function is defined over
an exponentially large domain, we will work with the value oracle model in which an oracle
will return the value of f(S), when queried with the set S ⊆ X.
Notice that by fixing the collection C to any particular combinatorial structure, one can
define a subclass of the problems of interest. In this contribution, we study the following
fundamental problems in MSCP :
• Combinatorial Reverse Auction (CRA): We are given a set X of elements and
the collection C consists of only the set X i.e. in the required solution all the elements
must be covered. This models the situation where a set of jobs needs to be assigned
to multiple workers.
• Submodular Vertex Cover (MS-VC): We are given an undirected graph G(V,E).
Element set X is the same as the set of vertices V and the collection C consists of all
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the vertex covers of the graph. Recall that a set S ⊆ V is a vertex cover if every e ∈ E
is incident on a vertex in S.
• Submodular Shortest Path (MS-SP): We are given a connected undirected graph
G(V,E), and a pair of vertices s, t ∈ V . Element set X is the same as the set of edges
E and the collection C consists of all the paths from s to t.
• Submodular Minimum Perfect Matchings (MS-MPM): We have a undirected
graph G = (V,E) with cost functions over E. G contains at least one perfect matching.
Element set X is the set of all edges, and the collection C is defined as the set of all
perfect matchings of G. Recall that a set M ⊆ E is a perfect matching of G if exactly
one edge in M is incident on every vertex.
• Submodular Minimum Spanning Tree (MS-MST): We are given a connected
undirected graph G = (V,E) with cost functions over E. Element set X is the set of
all edges, and the collection C is the set of spanning trees of G. Recall that a spanning
tree is a minimal connected subgraph of G.
For each of the above problems, we establish upper and lower bounds on the approxi-
mation factor in both the single agent and the multi-agent setting.
2.1 Motivation, Background and Our Results
A multitude of fundamental computational problems with real-world applications can be
cast in the following framework: We are given a set X of elements, a collection C of subsets
of X (i.e. C ⊆ 2X) and a cost function f over the subsets of X. The collection C is typically
specified via a combinatorial structure like a matroid or a graph property (for instance, the
set of all spanning trees in a graph). The objective is to select a set S ∈ C that minimizes
f(S).
A major focus in theoretical computer science has been on linear cost functions. The
study of combinatorial problems with linear cost functions has led to great developments in
the theory of exact and approximation algorithms. However, linear cost functions do not
always model the complex dependencies of the costs in a real-world scenario. Submodular
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functions form a rich class and capture the natural properties of economies of scale or the
law of diminishing returns. As a result, they model cost functions seen in practice more
accurately than linear functions.
Another feature that arises in practice is the presence of multiple agents, where each
agent has her own cost function. Thus, in the optimal solution, each agent might build
only a part of the required combinatorial structure. For example, the Internet is a complex
multi-agent system where each service provider owns only a part of the network. For linear
cost functions, it is easy to see that having multiple agents doesn’t change the complexity
of the original problem. However, this is not the case for more general cost functions, such
as submodular functions.
In the past, there has been some work along these lines (See [13, 21, 57, 59, 28]), but
to the best of our knowledge, none of them has studied multi-agent submodular functions
over a truly combinatorial structure. For instance, the work of [13] studies submodular
function maximization over matroid constraints in presence of a single agent. The work of
[57, 59] considers the multi-agent submodular functions but the combinatorial structure (or
the collection C) used in their problem is either the set of all subsets or the whole set itself.
With this background, we propose to extend the algorithmic study of covering problems
to the more general model of submodularity and multiple agents. From a practical viewpoint,
each of the problem we study is meaningful in its own right. Shortest path and spanning trees
are used in network design problems, and it is natural to assume that different agents could
have different submodular cost functions depending on the set of edges they can construct
cheaply. Similarly, the other problems are used in a variety of situations, especially in
relation to algorithmic game theory.
From a theoretical perspective, one would like to extend the tools and techniques de-
veloped for combinatorial problems with linear cost functions to as general a setting as
possible. Submodular functions are a natural generalization where one would expect to be
able to extend the techniques. Despite the significant recent progress on some of the fun-
damental problems in this area [13, 21, 57, 59, 28], the algorithmic theory for combinatorial
problems with submodular cost functions is not substantially developed yet. Many more
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basic questions remain to be identified and solved, which could form the basis of tools and
techniques for solving more complex problems.
2.1.1 Our Results
We give an approximation algorithm and a matching information theoretic lower bound
for each of the subclass of problems that we mentioned earlier1. In case of shortest path,
minimum spanning tree and minimum perfect matching problems, the bounds established
are polynomial and tight upto poly-logarithmic factors. Ignoring these logarithmic factors,
we present these results in the table below. For the reverse auction problem, m is the number
of agents and n is the number of items, whereas for all other problems, n is the number of
vertices in the instance graph.
Table 1: Upper and lower bounds for multi-agent submodular covering problems
Single-Agent Multi-Agent
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Reverse Auction 1 1 Ω(log n) min(m, log n) [30]
Vertex Cover 2− ε 2 Ω(log n) 2 log n
Shortest Path Ω(n2/3) O(n2/3) Ω(n2/3) O(n)
Perfect Matching Ω(n) n Ω(n) n
Spanning Tree Ω(n) n Ω(n) n
Note that the minimum perfect matching and minimum spanning tree problems, which
are polynomial time solvable with linear cost functions, have a large hardness factor with
submodular cost functions. We would like to draw attention to our lower bound result for
the vertex cover problem in the single agent case. In the classical vertex cover problem, the
best known approximation factor is 2, and the best known hardness of approximation is
1.3606 (assuming P 6= NP ) [16]. Khot et al [41] showed that achieving a factor of 2 − ε
‘might be’ hard by presenting a hardness result based on UGC conjecture [39]. Our results
for the single agent submodular vertex cover problem implies that, if the cost function over
the set of vertices is submodular, then the optimal approximation factor is indeed 2.
1With the exception of the multi-agent submodular shortest path problem, where a gap remains. We
comment on this aberration in Section 2.5.2.
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Our hardness results use information theoretic arguments and follow the framework
explained in Section 2.2, with some modifications specific to each problem. Our algorithms
are based on LP rounding or greedy methods.
We would like to point out that our results for perfect matchings and spanning trees
extend to the class of subadditive cost functions, and to related combinatorial structures
such as Steiner trees.
Remark: Independent of our work, recently, Iwata and Nagano [35] also gave factor
2 approximation algorithm for the single agent submodular vertex cover. They also study
submodular cost set cover and submodular edge cover problem.
2.1.2 Related Work
Submodular functions have been of great interest in optimization in the past. The most
fundamental optimization problem concerning submodular functions is, perhaps, the non-
monotone submodular function minimization problem. A sequence of papers in this di-
rection [53, 34, 32, 51, 33, 36] has resulted in fast strongly polynomial time combinatorial
algorithms. Another related work is that of non-monotone submodular function maximiza-
tion [21]. Both these algorithms are often used as a subroutine in solving the configuration
LPs corresponding to some other submodular combinatorial optimization problem.
Another body of work in optimization over submodular functions deals with welfare
maximization [13, 59, 22, 40]. In this context, the reverse auction problem (CRA) that
we study, can be thought of as submodular welfare minimization. Calinescu et al [13]
studied submodular function maximization subject to matroid constraints. They showed
that their problem contains as subcases, many other allocation problems, thus giving a
unified framework for studying such problems. Matching information theoretic lower bounds
were established in [48].
Svitkina and Fleischer [57] studied submodular objective function for problems like spars-





upper and lower bounds for
all these problems, showing that all these problems become much harder under submodular
costs. For the submodular reverse auctions, where a set of n goods has to be allocated to m
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agents (i.e. collection set C = {X}) with submodular cost functions to minimize the overall
cost, a simple greedy algorithm is known to have a factor log(n) [30]. Goemans et al [28]
gave an algorithm for constructing explicit approximate submodular functions by querying
polynomial number of times to the original submodular function. Some other related work
in optimization that uses submodular functions includes [55, 30, 58, 56, 60]. Recently, ques-
tions regarding the testability [54] and learnability [6] of submodular functions have been
the matter of study.
Recall that the problems we consider in this contribution are very well studied under
linear cost functions. Shortest path, perfect matching and spanning tree can be solved
exactly in polynomial time. An algorithm for the vertex cover problem with factor 2 for
weighted graphs was first given by [7]. The best known hardness of approximation for Vertex
Cover is 1.3606 (assuming P 6= NP ) [16]. Using UGC conjecture [39], Khot and Regev [41]
showed that achieving a factor of 2− ε is hard.
2.2 Preliminaries: Information Theoretic Lower Bounds
A problem in our model is said to have information theoretic lower bound of α if any
randomized algorithm that approximates the optimum to a factor α with high probability
requires super-polynomial number of queries to the value oracle.
By Yao’s principle, it suffices to establish the lower bounds for deterministic algorithms
acting on an input which is picked randomly from some fixed distribution. To show these
approximation gaps, we follow the general framework which was also used in [57, 28, 21].
We will outline this framework in the single agent setting.
The idea is to first choose a problem instance which has a suitably large collection set
C ⊆ 2X of interest. For example, for the minimum spanning tree problem, we choose a graph
that has exponentially many spanning trees. Then we design two submodular cost functions
f and g. Typically, g is deterministically picked, whereas f is chosen from a distribution.
The choice of f and g relies on the following two properties: a) f and g must be ‘hard to
distinguish’ in the sense that they return the same value on almost all queries and b) The
optimum values of f and g over C must differ by a large factor. Intuitively this amounts to
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‘hiding’ a particular set Q ∈ C in f by setting f(Q) to a low value. We employ the following
useful construct to achieve this:
Definition 1 (Two-partition function). A function f : 2X → R+ is said to be a two-
partition function if
f(S) = |Q ∩ S| + min {|Q ∩ S|, r}
where Q ⊆ X, Q is the complement of Q and r is any constant.
It is easy to verify that a two-partition function is submodular. Such a function hides
the set Q in the following sense: f(S) differs from |S| only for those sets which have a large
enough intersection with Q. On the other hand, by choosing a suitably small value of r,
we can ensure large difference between the values of the set Q under f and g. The set Q is
chosen from a distribution over C. Since C is designed to be extremely large, this leaves a
very small probability of an arbitrary query S made by an algorithm differentiating f from
g. By the union bound and a computation path argument [57, 21], an algorithm making
polynomially many number of queries cannot distinguish between f and g. Combining this
with the gap in the optima of f and g, one proves the lower bound.
We note an important observation from the above discussion, which we will use in our
proofs of lower bounds:
Observation 1. To prove an information theoretic lower bound using two submodular func-
tions f and g with a gap in their optimum values, it suffices to prove that Pr[ f(Q) 6= g(Q) ]
is super-polynomially small over the random choice of Q ⊆ X.
2.3 Combinatorial Reverse Auction
In this problem we are given a set J , of n elements and m agents. For each agent i we
have a normalized monotone submodular cost function fi : 2J → R+. We wish to partition
the elements among the agents to minimize the total cost. We prove a Ω(log n) information
theoretic hardness result and provide an algorithm that matches this bound. We also prove
the same algorithm to be m-approximate. Another log n-approximate algorithm for this
problem had previously appeared in [30].
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2.3.1 Proof of hardness
As discussed in Section 2.2, the idea is to construct a deterministic instance and a random
instance of the CRA so that the optimal solutions of these two instances differ by a factor
of Ω(log n), and then show that with high probability, a deterministic algorithm which uses
only polynomially many value queries can not distinguish between these two instances.
Consider the following deterministic instance of CRA: There are m agents and a set J of
n = m(m+1)2/4 elements. The elements are equally partitioned into m blocks J1, J2, ..., Jm.
We will choose m such that m = 2d − 1, for some d. Now each number i between 1 and
m can be represented as a vector ai in GF [2]d. Let Gi =
⋃
1≤k≤m, ai·ak=1 Jk. For each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, agent i is only interested in elements in Gi. It is easy to see, that Gi consists of







Thus each agent is interested in only (m+ 1)/2 blocks of elements and for each block there
are (m+1)/2 agents who are interested in it. Now, we define the cost function fi : 2J −→ R+
as follows:
fi(S) =
 min{|S|, (m+ 1)
2/4} If S ⊆ Gi
∞ Otherwise
Let us analyze the optimal cost of this instance. We say that an agent is marked if the
total size of elements assigned to him is at least (m+1)2/4. Among all the optimal solutions,
let OPT be the one that maximizes the number of marked agents. We claim that at least
d agents are marked in OPT. Suppose not, then without loss of generality, we may assume
M = {1, 2, ..., t} to be the set of marked agents and t < d. The system of linear equations
ai ·x = 0,∀1 ≤ i ≤ t has at least one solution x∗ ∈ GF [2]d, since number of equations is less
than the number of variables. Let k be the number between 1 and m corresponding to the
vector x∗. This implies that no agent in M is interested in block Jk. Let Ak = {i1, i2, ..., iw}
be the set of agents who are assigned some elements in Jk. Then Ak ∩M = ∅. Therefore,
we can mark one more agent by transferring the elements in Jk from agents i2, i2, ..., iw to
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agent i1 without changing the cost of the new solution. This is a contradiction because of
the choice of OPT. Hence, the optimal cost of this instance is at least (m+ 1)2d/4.
For the random instance, we have the same sets of agents and elements. Also, each agent
is interested in the same set of elements. However, the cost function for each agent is defined
by a probability distribution on the set assigned to her. Next we describe our construction
of the random cost functions explicitly.
For each element, assign it uniformly at random to one of the agents who is interested in
it. Let Si be the set of elements which agent i gets. Clearly (S1, S2, ..., Sm) forms a partition




|S ∩ Si|+ min
{






If S ⊆ Gi
∞ Otherwise
where δ > 0 is a fixed constant. Notice that we have replaced the |S| from the definition
of fi(S) by a two-partition function (Recall Definition 1).
Now we show that with high probability, a deterministic algorithm using only poly-
nomially many value queries can not distinguish between f = (f1, f2, ..., fm) and g =
(g1, g2, ..., gm). We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any subset S of elements and any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Pr[fi(S) 6= gi(S)] = e−Ω(m).
Proof. Suppose S is a subset of elements and 1 ≤ i ≤ m. By our construction, gi(S) ≤ fi(S).
Therefore Pr[fi(S) 6= gi(S)] = Pr[gi(S) < fi(S)].
First of all, we claim that the above probability is maximized when S ⊆ Gi and |S| =
(m+ 1)2/4. For this, if S 6⊆ Gi, then fi(S) = gi(S) =∞ hence Pr[fi(S) < gi(S)] = 0. Now
suppose S ⊆ Gi and |S| ≥ (m+ 1)2/4. Then fi(S) = (m+ 1)2/4. Therefore
Pr [gi(S) < fi(S)] = Pr
[
|S ∩ Si|+ min
{








This probability can only increase when we remove elements from S. For the case when
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|S| ≤ (m+ 1)2/4, we get:
Pr [ gi(S) < fi(S) ] = Pr
[
|S ∩ Si|+ min
{






















Thus, this probability can only increase when more elements are added to S. Hence
under the condition S ⊆ Gi, |S| ≤ (m + 1)2/4, the probability is also maximized when
|S| = (m+ 1)2/4.
Now we assume S ⊆ Gi and |S| = (m + 1)2/4. In this case, Pr[gi(S) < fi(S)] =
Pr[|S ∩ Si| > (1 + δ)(m + 1)/2], which by a standard Chernoff bound arguments, can be
shown to be bounded by e−Ω(m).
If we define f(S) = (f1(S), ..., fm(S)) and g(S) = (g1(S), ..., gm(S)), then by a simple
union bound, as a corollary of the lemma, we have Pr[f(S) 6= g(S)] = poly(m)e−Ω(m).
Now suppose A is a deterministic algorithm which makes polynomially many queries to the
value oracle. Then by the union bound, with probability at most poly(m) · e−Ω(m), A can
distinguish between f and g. Notice that for the cost function g = (g1, ..., gm), the optimal
solution is at most (1 + δ)m(m + 1)/2 achieved by assigning Si to agent i. However, as
we showed, the optimal solution for the cost function f = (f1, f2, ..., fm) has cost at least
d(m + 1)2/4, thus with high probability, A can not approximate a CRA instance within
factor (m+1)
2d/4
(1+δ)m(m+1)/2 ' d = c log n for some c < 1.
At last, by Yao’s principle, we have the following:
Theorem 2. A randomized approximation algorithm for the CRA problem within factor
c log n for some c < 1 needs to make exponentially many value queries.
2.3.2 A min(m, log n) approximation algorithm for combinatorial reverse auction
A log n-approximate algorithm for this problem appeared in [30]. In what follows we provide












xi,S ≥ 1 ∀u ∈ X






yu ≤ fi(S) ∀S ⊆ V, ∀i
yu ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ X
In LP1, xi,S is used to represent the fraction of set S that is allocated to agent i. Since
fi(S)−
∑
u∈S yu is a submodular function, we can construct a separation oracle for the dual
program using the submodular minimization algorithm as a subroutine. Thus we can solve
LP1 and LP2 optimally. The following lemma describes the structure of an optimal solution
to LP1.
Lemma 3. There exists an optimal fractional solution to LP1 such that for every agent i
the set Ti = { S : xi,S > 0 } forms a nested family.
Proof. Let x be any feasible solution to LP1. If Ti is not nested, then there exist A,B ∈ Ti
such that neither A nor B is contained in the other. We may assume xi,A ≥ xi,B. We will
construct another feasible solution x′ to LP1 as follows:
• x′i,A∪B = xi,B
• x′i,B = 0
• x′i,S = xi,S for all S ∈ X other than the
above.
• x′i,A = xi,A − xi,B
• x′i,A∩B = xi,B if A ∩B 6= ∅
• x′j,S = xj,S ∀j 6= i and ∀S ∈ X
By submodularity, one can verify that the cost of the solution x′ is at most the cost of x.
If the set T ′i corresponding to x′ is nested, we are done. Otherwise, we repeat the procedure




|S|2 strictly increases and is polynomially bounded.
Let x be an optimal solution of LP1 with cost W , satisfying the conditions in lemma 3
and Ti be the corresponding nested families of sets. Let T =
⋃
i Ti. Let Y denote the set of
uncovered elements in X. In each iteration pick the set (i, S) ∈ T minimizing fi(S)/|S∩Y |.
Add S to the cover and assign it to agent i. Remove all the newly covered elements from Y .
Repeat until all elements are covered. Since each Ti is a nested family, an agent can drop
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all but the largest set assigned to her. Let (i, S) be the set covering an element u in the
integral cover. Then we define α(u) = fi(S)/|S ∩ Y | to be the cost ‘borne’ by u. Note that∑
u α(u) is exactly the cost of the integral cover.
Let u ∈ X be the j’th element to be covered by this algorithm and let (i, S) be the set
chosen to cover it. Suppose u was picked during the algorithm. Then since x is a fractional
cover of Y , fi(S)/|S ∩ Y | ≤ W/|Y |.
α(u) ≤ fi(S)





(|X| − j + 1)
On the other hand, if u was not picked by the algorithm, then α(u) ≤ W/(|X| − j′ + 1) ≤
W/(|X| − j + 1) for some j′ < j.
Summing over all u, we conclude that the integral cover has cost at most W log n. To
prove that this algorithm is also m-approximate, observe that each set selected has cost at
most W . Moreover, each agent is assigned at most one set in the final solution. This proves
the claim.
2.4 Vertex Cover
In this section, we consider the submodular vertex cover problem. We first prove an informa-
tion theoretic lower bound of 2− ε (for any fixed ε) for the single agent case and provide an
algorithm with approximation ratio of 2. We then present a 2 log n approximation algorithm
for the multi-agent case and an information theoretic lower bound of Ω(log n).
2.4.1 Single agent case
We are given an undirected graph G(V,E) and a normalized monotone submodular function
f : 2V −→ R. We wish to find a vertex cover U ⊆ V of graph G such that f(U) is minimized.
Theorem 4. For every fixed ε > 0, any randomized algorithm for the submodular vertex
cover problem with an approximation ratio of 2− ε needs exponentially many queries to the
value oracle.
Proof. Consider a bipartite graph G(A ∪ B,E) such that |A| = |B| = n. The edge set
consists of n edges which forms a matching between A and B. Let R be a random minimum
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cardinality vertex cover of this graph, which can be picked by choosing one endpoint of every
edge uniformly at random.
Define the following two submodular cost functions.
fR(S) = min
{
|S ∩R| + min
{





g(S) = min { |S|, n }
Here δ is chosen such that 2/(1 + δ) = 2 − ε. Notice that the optimum value of the
vertex cover for the function fR is
(1+δ)n
2 , and for g it is n. Thus if we can show that any
randomized algorithm, cannot distinguish between fR and g with high probability, then it
will imply an inapproximability ratio of 2/(1 + δ) or 2− ε for the submodular vertex cover
problem.
From Observation 1 it suffices to show that for a deterministic query Q, Pr[ fR(Q) 6=
g(Q) ] is exponentially small, where the probability space is defined over the random choice
of set R. Since fR(S) ≤ g(S) for all S ⊆ V , fR(Q) 6= g(Q) implies fR(Q) < g(Q).
Let Q∗ be the optimal query for which Pr[ fR(Q) < g(Q) ] is maximized. We will show
that |Q∗| = n. First, suppose that |Q| ≥ n, then
Pr[ fR(Q) < g(Q) ] = Pr[ fR(Q) < n ]
= Pr
[
|Q ∩R| + min
{





which increases as the size of Q is reduced. Thus the size of the optimal query in this case
is n.
Now suppose |Q| ≤ n. In this case,
Pr[ fR(Q) < g(Q) ] = Pr[ fR(Q) < |Q|]
= Pr
[
|Q ∩R| + min
{














= Pr[ |Q ∩R| > (1 + δ)n
2
]
which increases as |Q| is raised. Therefore, the optimal query size in this case is also n.
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Hence |Q∗| = n. Let k be the number of edges for which both the end points are
contained in Q∗ and Q1 be the set of these endpoints (|Q1| = 2k). Let Q2 = Q∗ −Q1. We
have:
Pr[ fR(Q∗) < g(Q∗)] = Pr
[


















If δk ≥ (1−δ) |Q2|2 , then the expression in equation (1) reduces to Pr[|Q2∩R| > |Q2|] =
0. On the other hand if δk < (1− δ) |Q2|2 , then




which implies |Q2| > δn. Every vertex in Q2 belongs to R with probability 12 with indepen-
dence, and E[|Q2 ∩R|] = |Q2|/2 = δn/2. Therefore, applying Chernoff bounds:
Pr[ fR(Q∗) < g(Q∗)] = Pr
[














Hence, the probability that an arbitrary query Q can distinguish between f and g is
exponentially small.
Theorem 5. There exists an algorithm which finds a 2-approximate solution to the single
agent vertex cover problem with submodular costs.
Proof. We formulate the problem as a configurational LP and round the fractional solution.
Let variable xS be an indicator variable for the set S of vertices being the vertex cover.
Then the following LP is a lower bound on the value of the optimal integral solution.









e∈δ(v) ye is a submodular function, and we can use the submodular min-










xS ≥ 1 ∀(u, v) ∈ E








ye ≤ f(S) ∀S ⊆ V
ye ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
allows us to find an optimal fractional solution to the LP3 with value at most OPT. Let x∗
be this solution. Output Q =
{






as the vertex cover. Clearly,








S ≥ 1/2 must hold, thus Q is a





Sf(S) = 2 ·OPT.
2.4.2 Multi-Agent Case
We are given an undirected graph G(V,E) and a normalized monotone submodular function
fi : 2V −→ R for each agent i. We wish to find a vertex cover U ⊆ V , and a partition
U1, U2, · · · , Uk of U such that
∑
i f(Ui) is minimized.
Now we will sketch the proof of the lower bound for the multi-agent case. Consider a
suitable instance graph such as the one used in the proof of Theorem 4, and fix a vertex
cover Q. For any set S with vertices in V − Q, we will set the cost of S very high for
every agent. Hence, it will be easy for any algorithm to zero in onto Q as a ‘good’ vertex
cover. However, we can build the same multi-agent cost structure on top of Q, as used the
proof of hardness result of reverse auctions (See Section 2.3). Essentially, the problem of
finding minimum cost vertex cover then reduces to that of assigning vertices in Q to the
various agents so as to minimize the total cost - which is constrained by Theorem 1 to an
information theoretic lower bound of Ω(log n). Thus we get the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Any randomized algorithm for the multi-agent submodular vertex cover problem
with an approximation ratio c log n for some constant c < 1 needs exponentially many queries
to the value oracle.
2 log n-approximate algorithm: We begin by finding an optimal fraction solution x
using the LP relaxation LP5, which gives a lower bound on the optimal integral solution.
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The given LP can be solved by constructing a separation oracle of the dual program as shown
earlier in the single agent case. Consider the set Q =
{








which forms a valid vertex cover. We will now round 2x to find an allocation of vertices in















xi,S ≥ 1 ∀(u, v) ∈ E
xi,S ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ V, ∀i
At any step of the algorithm let Z contain the uncovered elements inQ. For any fractional












u ∈ Z that minimizes α2x(u). Among the sets containing u, choose a set (i, S) randomly
with probability proportional to xi,S . Remove all the newly covered elements from Z and
iterate until all the elements in Q are covered. Let y denote this integral cover.
Analysis: Let u1, u2, ... be the order in which the vertices in Q get covered. We claim
that E[αy(uj)] ≤ W/(|Q| − j + 1). Suppose uj was picked during the algorithm. Then,
E[αy(uj)] ≤ α2x(uj). Since 2x covers the remaining |Q| − j + 1 elements in Q, α2x(uj) ≤
W/(|Q| − j + 1). On the other hand, if uj was not picked during the algorithm, then
E[αy(uj)] = α2x(u′j) ≤
W
(|Q| − j′ + 1)
≤ W
(|Q| − j + 1)









α2x(u) ≤ W log n ≤ 2OPT · log n
This algorithm can be derandomized using standard techniques.
2.5 Shortest Path
In this problem we are given an undirected graph G = (V,E) and a monotone submodular
cost function fi : 2E :−→ R for each agent i. The goal is to find a path P between two
given vertices, and partition of P into P1, P2, · · · , Pk such that
∑
i fi(Pi) is minimized. We
first consider the single agent case and provide an information-theoretic lower bound of
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Ω(n2/3) for all fixed ε > 0, ignoring poly-logarithmic factors. We also present an O(n2/3)-
approximation algorithm for this problem. Lastly, we comment on the gap that exists
between the upper and lower bounds for the multi-agent case, in context of our results for
the single agent case.
2.5.1 Single agent case
As in previous sections, we proceed by designing two submodular functions that are hard to
distinguish in polynomially many queries but have different optimal values. In the general
framework outlined in section 2.2, this is accomplished by ‘hiding’ a random element of lower
cost from the target collection C in one of the functions. In this case, C is the set of all s− t
paths. However an identical analysis does not work in this case. This is because for a pair
of adjacent edges, the events that these edges belong to the random shortest s− t path are
are not independent precluding the use of Chernoff bounds which makes the analysis a lot
more involved. In this section we use a simple pigeon hole principle argument to solve this
problem.
Theorem 7. Any randomized approximation algorithm for the submodular shortest path





needs super-polynomially many queries.
Proof. Consider the graph G which is a level graph having n2/3 + 2 levels of vertices. First
level contains only vertex s and the last level contains only t. Each other level has n1/3
vertices and there exists a complete bipartite graph between successive levels. Let R be a
randomly chosen s− t path of length n2/3 + 1.
Define the following two submodular cost functions f, g : 2E −→ R+:
f(Q) = min
{




|Q|, n2/3 + 1
}






By Observation 1, to prove the lower bound it suffices to prove that Pr[f(Q) 6= g(Q)] is
super-polynomially small for an arbitrary query Q. This happens if and only if f(Q) < g(Q).
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Making arguments analogous to the proof of theorem 4, Pr[ f(Q) < g(Q) ] is maximized
when |Q| = 1 + n2/3. Therefore,
Pr[ f(Q) < g(Q) ] = Pr[ |Q ∩R| > log2 n ]
Let Eeven and Eodd be the set of edges which are at distance even and odd respectively
from the vertex s. Define Qeven = Q ∩ Eeven and Qodd = Q ∩ Eodd. Similarly define Reven
and Rodd. Without loss of generality, let |Qodd| ≥ |Qeven|. Thus,
Pr[ |Q ∩R| > log2 n ] = Pr[ |Qeven ∩Reven|+ |Qodd ∩Rodd| > log n ]




Note that the edges in Rodd were chosen independently at random since R was chosen
uniformly at random. Also E [|Qodd ∩Rodd|] = O(1). Thus by Chernoff bounds we conclude





, which is super-polynomially small. This
proves the theorem.
Theorem 8. There exists an algorithm which finds an O(n2/3) approximate solution to the
single agent shortest path problem with submodular costs.
Proof. We begin with two simple approaches to get an O(n)-approximate algorithm. Inter-
estingly, we can combine the two ideas to obtain an O(n2/3)-approximate algorithm for the
problem.
Goemans et al [28] address the problem of finding approximate explicit representations
for submodular functions. They use an ellipsoidal approximation of the polymatroid of the
submodular function f : 2X → R+ to assign a weight we to every element e ∈ X. The
approximated cost of a set is then defined as f̂(S) =
√∑
e∈S we. They prove that for all S,
f̂(S) ≤ f(S) ≤
√
|X|f̂(S)
and therefore, f̂ can be though of as an explicit approximate representation of f . To solve
our submodular shortest path problem, a possible approach would be to find the weights
we for all the edges of the graph and then find the path P minimizing f̂(P ). This can be






just reduces to the shortest path problem with linear costs. This approach yields a O(
√
E)
approximation algorithm. For dense graphs this factor can be as bad as Ω(n). This method
can be useful if the given graph has few edges.
Another simple algorithm to get an O(n) approximation for this problem is to ‘guess’
the cost of the heaviest edge e in the path, use that as a lower bound on OPT. Define cost
of an edge e as f({e}). The algorithm runs in multiple phases. In each phase choose a new
edge and drop all edges that weigh more than the given edge and return any s− t path(if it
exists) in the pruned graph. We finally select the smallest s− t paths among those returned
during the phases. It is easy to see that this is an O(l) approximate algorithm where l is
the number of edges in the optimal path. Once again this can be as bad as O(n) for some
graphs. This approach can be useful if the given graph is dense, since sufficiently dense
graphs are known to have small diameter.
The central idea of our algorithm is to decompose the graph in to sparse and dense
clusters. Then we use the first approach to account for sparse regions of the graph and deal
with the dense regions using ideas from the second approach.
The algorithm runs in multiple phases, where after each phase we output a path. Final
solution is the minimum cost path among these paths. Each phase is identified by a unique
edge in the edge set, thus there are |E| phases. Following are the steps, in order, which
constitutes a single phase.
Pruning Step: Let e be the edge corresponding to the current phase. Delete all edges that
weigh more than e. Let Ge denote the pruned graph. The phase terminates prematurely if
the s and the t are disconnected in Ge.
Separation Step: In this step we partition the edge set into those that are in dense regions
of the graph and those which belong to sparse regions. Successively remove vertices from
Ge whose degree in the remaining graph is at most n1/3. Also remove the edges incident on
these vertices and add them to the set Se. Continue removing vertices until all the remaining
vertices have degree more than n1/3. Let Re be the remaining edges in Ge. Edges in Se
belong to the sparse part of the graph while those in Re constitute the dense part of the
graph.
30
Search Step: Using the algorithm in [28], we find an explicit representation for the function
f restricted to the Se. Redefine the costs for edges in Se to be the weights returned by the
ellipsoidal approximation subroutine and set the cost of each edge in Re to be a zero.
Treating these edge costs as additive quantities, find the shortest s− t path passing through
e. Let Pe be this path.
Compression Step: The path returned by the search step might contain too many edges,
which could be bad for the algorithm. In this step, we compress the path Pe by replacing
some of its subpaths by smaller paths(in terms of number of edges). For this we analyze
the intersection of Pe with every connected component of G (V,Re). Let H be an arbitrary
connected component of G (V,Re) and let a be the first vertex where Pe enters H and b
be the final vertex that it passes through before leaving H for the last time. Replace the
subpath of Pe between a and b with the shortest path in H(in terms of the number of
edges) connecting them(refer to the figure below). Do this for every connected component
of G (V,Re). Report this modified path as the solution for this phase.
Components in G(V, Re)
Original path Path after replacing segments in G(V, Re)
Figure 1: Shortening the path in dense regions
Analysis: To prove that the above algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of O(n2/3)
we will use the following observation.
Observation 2. Since all the vertices remaining after the first step have degree greater than




Let POPT be an optimal path for the problem under the submodular cost function f .
Let α be the heaviest edge in this path. Consider the phase corresponding to α. During
the separation step of every phase we remove at most n4/3 edges since each of the chosen
vertices have a degree less than n1/3. Thus the subroutine gives an explicit cost function
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that is a O(n2/3) approximation for all subsets of Sα. Let f̂(A) denote the cost of any
A ⊆ Sα returned by the subroutine. Thus for all A ⊆ Sα, we have:
f̂(A) ≤ f(A) ≤ n2/3f̂(A) (2)
Let Pα be the solution returned by this phase. Define Xα = POPT ∩ Sα, Yα = Pα ∩ Sα
and Zα = Pα ∩Rα. It follows that,
2n2/3f(POPT ) ≥ n2/3f(POPT ) + n2/3f({α}) (3)
≥ n2/3f(Xα) + n2/3f({α}) (4)
≥ n2/3f̂(Xα) + n2/3f({α}) (5)
≥ n2/3f̂(Yα) + n2/3f({α}) (6)
≥ n2/3f̂(Yα) + f(Zα) (7)
≥ f(Yα) + f(Zα) (8)
≥ f(Yα ∪ Zα) (9)
= f(Pα) (10)
Equations (3) and (4) follow from monotonicity. Equation (5) uses equation (2). Equation
(6) then follows from equation (5) since Pα is the shortest path under the function f̂ . Also,
using the observation above and summing over all components of G (V,Rα) we conclude
that |Zα| can not be more than n2/3. Thus equation (7) follows from equation (6) since each
edge in |Zα| costs at most f({α}) and f is submodular. We arrive at equations (8), (9),
(10) using equation (2) and the submodularity of function f .
2.5.2 Multi-Agent case
One glance at Table 1 reveals the fact that the multi-agent submodular shortest path problem
is the only problem left ‘open’ in the sense that we do not have an algorithm that matches
the Ω(n2/3) information theoretic lower bound. We will first explain why this gap exists,
and then elaborate on some of the interesting issues it emphasizes.
Obviously, the Ω(n2/3) lower bound from Theorem 7 also applies in presence of mul-
tiple agents. However, our algorithm from the previous section cannot be ported to the
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multi-agent case. Recall the two basic approaches we outlined that yield O(n) approxima-
tions to the single agent submodular shortest path problem: 1) Pruning the graph of edges
heavier than the heaviest edge in the optimal solution and 2) Ellipsoidal approximation of
the submodular function as provided in [28]. While we can still use the former to obtain
an O(n)-approximation in the multi-agent case, the latter fails due to inherent computa-
tional hardness. Finding a path P that minimizes the ellipsoidal approximation function
f̂(P ) was computationally feasible, because minimizing f̂(P ) is equivalent to minimizing(
f̂(P )
)2
, which reduces to finding the shortest path under linear costs. For this approach
to work in the multi-agent case however, we need to find an s − t path P , and partition it
into the m agents as P1, ..., Pm such that
∑
i f̂i(Pi) is minimized. This function is not lin-
ear in terms of the ellipsoidal weights, and in particular is known to be NP-hard to minimize.
The need for a combined computational and communicational lower bound: It
is important to note however, that the lower bound established by Theorem 7 is the best
possible information theoretic hardness result. Recall that such lower bounds only limit the
number of calls made to the value oracle, and no restriction is placed on the computational
complexity of the algorithm outside of the oracle calls. Indeed, it is easy to generalize the
algorithm in the previous section to the multi-agent case, if we have the computational ca-
pacity to minimize the non-linear objective function discussed above. Therefore, there does
exist an algorithm that makes polynomially many calls to the value oracle, performs expo-
nentially many other computational operations and guarantees an approximation factor of
O(n2/3). This indicates that a stronger hardness result needs to combine the computational
and information theoretic complexity of the problem into one argument. To our knowledge,
such a combined hardness result is not known for any problem.
2.6 Perfect Matching
In this section, we consider the multi-agent submodular minimum perfect matching problem.
In this problem we are given a bipartite graph G(V,E) where |V | = n, containing at least one
perfect matching and a normalized monotone submodular function fi : 2E −→ R+ for each
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agent i. We wish to find a perfect matching M , and a partition of M into M1,M2, · · · ,Mm
such that
∑
i fi(Mi) is minimized. We first prove an information theoretic lower bound of
Ω(n) on the approximability of the single agent case, which also implies the same bound for
the multi-agent case. Then, we give an n-approximate algorithm for the multi-agent case.
As in previous sections, we proceed by designing two submodular functions that are hard
to distinguish in polynomially many queries but have widely differing optimal values. In the
general framework outlined in section 2.2, this is accomplished by ‘hiding’ a random element
of lower cost from the target collection C in one of the functions. In this case, C is the set
of all perfect matchings. Once again choosing a random matching from C however does not
serve our purpose because for a fixed pair of edges, the events that these edges belong to
the random matching are not independent, thus precluding the use of Chernoff bounds. We
circumvent this problem by using the following result from the theory of random graphs
[10]:
Lemma 9. Let G(n, n, p) be a random bipartite graph on 2n vertices such that each edge is
present independently with probability p. Then
Pr[ G(n, n, p) contains no perfect matching ] = O(ne−np)
Now instead of hiding a randomly chosen perfect matching, we hide a collection of
randomly and independently chosen edges that contains a perfect matching with high prob-
ability. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Any randomized approximation algorithm for the submodular minimum cost





needs super-polynomially many queries.
There exists an algorithm that approximately finds an n-approximate minimum cost matching
in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider the complete bipartite graph Kn,n. We choose a random subset R of edges
by picking each edge independently with probability p = log2 n/n. By applying lemma








Define the following two submodular cost functions fR, g : 2E −→ R+:
fR(Q) = min
{
|Q ∩R| + min{ |Q ∩R|, (1 + δ) log2 n }, n
}
g(Q) = min { |Q|, n }
With probability 1−O(ne− log2 n), R contains a perfect matching and hence the minimum
cost of a perfect matching in f is at most (1 + δ) log2 n. Therefore the ratio of optima in g






Now we look at the probability that the algorithm can not distinguish f and g. By
Observation 1 it suffices to prove that Pr[fR(Q) 6= g(Q)] is super-polynomially small for an
arbitrary query Q. It’s easy to see that fR(S) ≤ g(S), thus these two functions differ on Q
if and only if fR(Q) < g(Q).
Making arguments analogous to the proof of theorem 4, Pr[ fR(Q) < g(Q) ] is maximized
when |Q| = n. Therefore,
Pr[ fR(Q) < g(Q) ] = Pr
[
|Q ∩R| > (1 + δ) log2 n
]
Since E[|Q∩R|] = log2 n and edges were picked uniformly at random, we can apply Chernoff
bounds to conclude that this probability is O(e−δ2 log
2 n). This proves the theorem.
Factor n approximation algorithm for MS-MPM: We are given a graph G(V,E)
and submodular cost functions fi for each agent. Define a new cost function w over E
as we = mini fi({e}) and define w(Z) =
∑
e∈Z we for all Z ⊆ E. Since w is an additive
valuation function we can find a minimum value perfect matching in polynomial time. Let
M be such a matching. Assign each edge e ∈M to the agent having the minimum valuation
for that edge. Let the cost of this solution under the original valuation functions be W .
Analysis: We now prove that this is an n-approximate algorithm. By submodularity
we have W ≤ w(M). Let M0 be an optimal solution of MS-MPM having value OPT. Since
M is a minimum weight matching under w, w(M) ≤ w(M0).
Let wmax = maxe∈M0{fi(e) | e assigned to agent i in M0}. By submodularity of the
cost functions, w(M0) ≤ n · wmax. By monotonicity we have wmax ≤ OPT . Therefore,
W ≤ w(M) ≤ w(M0) ≤ n · wmax ≤ n ·OPT
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This completes the analysis.
2.7 Spanning Tree
In this section, we consider the multi-agent submodular minimum spanning tree problem.
We are given a connected graph G(V,E) where |V | = n and a normalized monotone sub-
modular function fi : 2E −→ R+ for each agent i. We want to find a spanning tree T of G,
and a partition of T into T1, T2, · · · , Tm such that
∑
i fi(Ti) is minimized. We first prove an
information theoretic lower bound of Ω(n) on the approximability of the single agent case,
which also implies the same bound for the multi-agent case. Then, we give an n-approximate
algorithm for the multi-agent case.
To prove the lower bound we will provide two submodular functions that can not be
distinguished in polynomially many queries and have widely differing optimal values. As in
Section 2.6, we will use the following lemma [10] in the proof.
Lemma 11. Let G(n, p) be a random graph on n vertices such that each edge is present
independently with probability p. Then
Pr[ G(n, p) is disconnected ] ≤ n(1− p)n.
Theorem 12. Any randomized approximation algorithm for the submodular minimum span-





needs super-polynomially many queries. There exists
an algorithm that approximately finds an n-approximate spanning tree in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider Kn, the clique graph on n vertices. We choose a random subset of edges R,
by picking each edge independently with probability p = log2 n/n. By applying Lemma 11,





, which is super-polynomially small.
Define the following two submodular cost functions fR, g : 2E −→ R+:
fR(Q) = min
{
|Q ∩R| + min
{




g(Q) = min { |Q|, n }
With probability 1−O(ne−nε), R is connected and hence, the cost of the optimal span-
ning tree in f is at most (1 + δ) log2 n. Therefore, the ratio of optimal solution values in g







Making arguments similar to the proof of Theorem 10, we conclude that Pr[ fR(Q) <
g(Q) ] = O(ne−δ
2 log2 n) for any queryQ. By observation 1, this suffices to prove the theorem.
Factor n approximation algorithm for MS-MST: We are given a graph G(V,E)
and submodular cost functions fi for each agent. Define a new cost function w over E as
we = mini fi({e}). Run Kruskal’s algorithm on G treating we as the cost of the edge e to
get a minimum spanning tree T . Assign each edge e ∈ T to the agent i minimizing fi({e}).
The proof that this constitutes an n-approximate solution follows similar arguments as the
analysis of the n-approximate algorithm for perfect matching.
2.8 Discussion
The setting that we have considered in this work is quite general, and is a very exciting
avenue of research. There are many other interesting problems in this class such as minimum
graph cut, edge cover which could be studied in the future work. We have considered the
covering problems in this work, one can ask the same questions for packing problems like
maximum matching. Extension to multi-agent makes a natural connection to Game Theory.
Mechanism design of these combinatorial problems also has interesting applications.
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CHAPTER III
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS WITH PARTIALLY PUBLIC
VALUATIONS
A central problem in computational mechanism design is that of combinatorial auctions, in
which an auctioneer wants to sell a heterogeneous set of items J to interested agents. Each
agent i has a valuation function fi(.) which describes her valuation fi(S) for every set S ⊆ J
of items. In this chapter, we consider combinatorial auctions where fi(.) can be expressed
as fi(S) = vif(S), where vi is a private single parameter of the agent, and the function f is
publicly known.
Single parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public val-
uations: We are given a set J of m items and a global public valuation function1
f : 2J → R. The function f can either be specified explicitly or via an oracle which
takes a set S as input and returns f(S). In addition, we have n agents each of whom has a
private multiplier vi such that the item set S provides vif(S) amount of utility to agent i.
The goal is to design a truthful mechanism which maximizes
∑
i vif(Si), where S1 · · ·Sn is
a partition of J .
Our motivation behind studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions
arise naturally in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio.
(b) From a theoretical point of view, this factorization of the valuation function simpli-
fies the bidding language, and renders the combinatorial auction more amenable to better
approximation factors.
We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts
1We do not make any explicit assumptions such as non-negativity or free disposal about the function
f . We provide a method to convert any non-truthful black-box algorithm into a truthful mechanism. This
black-box algorithm may make some implicit assumptions about f .
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any α-approximation non-truthful algorithm (α ≤ 1) for this problem into Ω( αlogn) and
Ω(α)-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial
time, respectively.
3.1 Motivation, Background and Our Results
Combinatorial auction is a central problem in computational mechanism design an auctioneer
wants to sell a set J of items to interested agents. Each agent i has a valuation function fi(.)
which describes her valuation fi(S) for every set S ⊆ J of items. In its most general form,
the entire valuation function is assumed to be private information which may not be revealed
truthfully by the agents. Maximizing the social welfare in a combinatorial auction with an
incentive-compatible mechanism is an important open problem. However, recent results
[18, 12] have established polynomial lower bounds on the approximation ratio of maximal-
in-range mechanisms - which account for a majority of positive results in mechanism design -
even when all the valuations are assumed to be submodular. On the other hand, in the non-
game-theoretic case, if all the agents’ valuations are public knowledge and hence truthfully
known, then we can maximize the social welfare to much better factors [19, 20, 59], under
varying degree of restrictions on the valuations. Our model studied in this chapter lies in
between these two extremes.
We explore the situation when some inherent property of the items induces a common
and publicly known partial information about the valuation function of the agents. For
instance, in position auctions in sponsored search, the agents’ valuation for a position consists
of a private value-per-click as well as a public click-through rate, that is known to the
auctioneer. Another situation where such private/public factorization of valuations arises
is advertisements in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. Suppose we are selling
TV ad-slots on a television network. There are m ad-slots and n advertisers interested in
them. Let us define a function f : 2[m] → Z+, such that for any set S of ad-slots f(S) is the
number of unique viewers who will see the ad if the ad is shown on each slot in S2. If an
2For a single ad-slot j, the function f({j}) is nothing but the television rating for that slot as computed
by rating agencies such as Nielsen. In fact, their data collection through set-top boxes results in a TV
slot-viewer bipartite graph on the sample population, from which f(S) can be estimated for any set S of ad
slots.
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advertiser i is willing to pay vi dollars per unique viewer reached by her ad, then her total
valuation of the set S is vif(S).
One can think of this model as combinatorial auctions with simplified bidding language.
The agents only need to specify one parameter vi as their bid. Moreover, our problem has
deeper theoretical connections to the area of single parameter mechanism design in general.
For single parameter domains such as ours, it is known that monotone allocation rules
characterize the set of all truthful mechanisms. An allocation rule or algorithm is said to
be monotone if the allocation parameter of an agent (f(Si) in our case) is non-decreasing in
his reported bid vi. Unfortunately, often it is the case that good approximation algorithms
known for a given class of valuation functions are not monotonic. It is an important and
well-known open question in algorithmic mechanism design to resolve whether the design
of monotone algorithms is fundamentally harder than the non-monotone ones. In other
words, it is not known if, for single parameter problems, we can always convert any α-
approximation algorithm into a truthful mechanism with the same factor. We believe that
our problem is a suitable candidate to attack this question as it gives a lot of flexibility in
defining the complexity of function f . From this discussion, it follows that the only lower
bound known for the approximation factor of a truthful mechanism in our setting is the
hardness of approximation of the underlying optimization problem.
3.1.1 Our Results and techniques
We give a general technique which accepts any (possibly non-truthful) α-approximation
algorithm for our problem as a black-box and uses it to construct a truthful mechanism





. We also give a truthful mechanism with factor




. Both these results are corollaries obtained by setting
parameters appropriately in Theorem 14 to achieve desired trade-off between the approx-
imation factor and the running time. Our results can also be interpreted as converting
non-monotone algorithms into monotone ones for the above model.
Our mechanisms are maximal-in-range, i.e., they fix a range R of allocations and com-
pute the allocation S ∈ R that maximizes the social welfare. The technical core of our work
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lies in careful construction of this range.
While the black-box algorithm may be randomized, our mechanism does not introduce
any further randomization. Depending upon whether the black-box algorithm is deter-
ministic or randomized, our mechanism is deterministically truthful or universally truthful
respectively (See Section 3.2 for definitions). The approximation factor of our mechanism
is deterministic (or with high probability or in expectation) if the black-box algorithm also
provides the approximation guarantees deterministically (or with high probability or in ex-
pectation).
Note that we don’t need to worry about how the public valuation function f is specified.
This is plausible since the function is accessed only from within the black-box algorithm.
Hence, our mechanism can be applied to any model of specification - whether it is specified
explicitly or through a value or demand oracle - using the corresponding approximation
algorithm from that model.
Submodular valuations arise naturally in practice from economies of scale or the law
of diminishing returns. Hence, we make a special note of our results when the public
valuation is submodular. Using the algorithm of [59] as black-box, our results imply a
Ω (1/ log n) and Ω(1) approximation factors in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time,
respectively. We would like to note that the standard greedy algorithm for submodular
welfare maximization is not monotone (See Appendix A.1 for a simple example) and hence,
not truthful. Similarly, the optimal approximation algorithm of [59] is also not known to
be non-monotone. For entirely private submodular valuations, the best known truthful
mechanism has factor Ω(1/
√
m) in the value oracle3 model [19] and Ω(logm log logm) in
the demand oracle4 model [17]. Note that the former mechanism is deterministically truthful
while the latter is universally truthful.
3In the value oracle model, a polytime algorithm must make at most polynomially many queries to the
function oracle, which returns f(S) when queried with the set S.
4When provided a pricing function p : [m] → R, the demand oracle returns the set S that maximizes
f(S) −
∑
j∈S p(j). A polytime algorithm in the demand oracle model is constrained to make at most
polynomially many such queries.
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3.1.2 Related Work
When agents have a general multi-parameter valuation function, the best known truthful
approximation of social welfare in the value oracle model is Ω(
√
logm/m) [31]. Under
subadditive valuation functions, [19] gave Ω(1/
√
m)-approximate deterministically truthful
mechanism in the value oracle model. It is known that no maximal-in-range mechanism
making polynomially many calls to the value oracle can have an approximation factor better
than Ω(1/m1/6)[18] even for the case of submodular valuation functions. A similar Ω(1/
√
m)
hardness result for maximal-in-range algorithms based on NP * P/poly appears in [12].
See [9] for a comprehensive survey of the results, and [52, 12] for other more recent work.
Previous work on the single parameter case of combinatorial auctions have primarily focused
on the single-minded bidders. In this setting, any bidder i is only interested in single set Si
and has a valuation vi for it. Lehmann et al. [46] gave a truthful mechanism which achieves
an essentially best-possible approximation factor of Ω(1/
√
m). For other results in single-
minded combinatorial auction, see [49, 2]. When the desired set is publicly known and only
the valuation is private, [4] gave a general technique which converts any α-approximation
algorithm into a truthful mechanism with factor α/ log(vmax). This result is very much in
spirit to our work, however the model and the techniques used are very different. Similarly,
[44] present a general framework which uses a gap-verifying linear program as black-box to
construct mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. Another example of such a black-
box construction is the work of Balcan et al [5] who construct universally truthful random
sampling auctions when the objective is revenue maximization.
For the non-truthful optimization, we note that our problem is hard up to a constant
factor (see [48]) even when all the agents have private value equal to 1 and with common val-
uation function being submodular. For designing monotone algorithms from non-monotone
algorithms in the Bayesian setting, see [29]. We also note that TV ad auctions are in use
by Google Inc. (see [50]), although currently they treat the valuations for a set of ad-slots
as additive with budget constraints, which yields a multi-parameter auction.
Organization: Section 3.2 provides a brief introduction to mechanism design with a few
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concepts relevant to our work. Readers familiar with design of truthful mechanisms can
skip to Section 3.3 in which we state some basic properties and assumptions about single
parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations. Section 3.4 introduces
our vector-fitting technique and in Section 3.4.1, we conduct a warm-up exercise by analyz-
ing a simple mechanism. Section 3.5 presents our main result, a vector-fitting mechanism
formalized by Theorem 14.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we will outline the basic concepts in mechanism design relevant to our work.
3.2.1 Truthfulness and Mechanism Design
Mechanism design attempts to address the game-theoretic aspect of optimization problems.
Let A be the set of alternatives, and ui(a) be the valuation of agent i if alternative a ∈ A
is picked. In a pure optimization setting, all the functions ui’s are assumed to be known to
the auctioneer, and a typical goal is to pick an alternative a ∈ A that maximizes
∑
i ui(a).
But from a game-theoretic perspective, the agents may have an incentive to lie about their
valuation function ui, if it leads to a better alternative for them. This kind of strategizing
often results in arbitrary behaviour from the agents, leading to a loss in the social welfare.
Mechanism design tackles this issue by designing algorithms such that truthfully reporting
their true valuation function is the dominant strategy for each agent, i.e. given any strategies
by all the other agents, reporting one’s true function maximizes the utility gained by this
agent.
There are three notions of truthfulness that may be applicable:
1. Deterministic truthfulness: The mechanism must be deterministic and an agent
maximizes her utility by reporting her true valuation, for any valuations of all other
agents.
2. Universal truthfulness: A universally truthful mechanism is a probability distribu-
tion over deterministically truthful mechanisms.
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3. Truthfulness in expectation: A mechanism is truthful in expectation if an agent
maximizes her expected utility by being truthful.
Every deterministically truthful mechanism is universally truthful and every universally
truthful mechanism is truthful in expectation. Hence, deterministic truthfulness is the
strictest notion of truthfulness. As noted earlier, our mechanism may be deterministically
or universally truthful depending upon whether the black-box α-approximation algorithm
is deterministic or randomized.
3.2.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Grove and Maximal-in-range Mechanisms
The Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism is a pivotal result in the field of mechanism













∗). It is now not difficult to see that with this payment
function, it is in best interest of every agent to report their true valuations, irrespective of
what others report.
As useful as the VCG mechanism is, it cannot be applied in many scenarios where the un-
derlying problem is hard. Solving the optimization problem approximately doesn’t preserve
the truthfulness always. To overcome this, maximal-in-range variant of the VCG mechanism
is a useful technique which optimizes over a smaller range of allocations. That is, the set of
allocations that the mechanism may ever produce - the range - is chosen to be a small subset
of the space of all allocations. The range is chosen to balance the following trade-off: A
larger range can yield better approximation but require greater computational complexity.
Note that such a range needs to be defined combinatorially without any knowledge of the
agents’ valuations.
For example, the Ω(1/
√
m)-approximate truthful mechanism from [19] is a maximal-in-
range mechanism.
3.3 Notations and Basic Properties
By boldface v, we will denote a vector of private multipliers of the agents, where vi is the
multiplier of agent i. For a constant β ≥ 0, let βv = (βv1, βv2, ..., βvn). By boldface S, we
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will denote the vector of allocations, where Si is the set of items allocated to agent i. We
will overload the function symbol f to express the social welfare as: f(v,S) =
∑
i vif(Si).
An allocation S is optimal for a multiplier vector v if it maximizes f(v,S).
We begin by observing two simple properties of our problem and its solutions: symmetry
and scale-freeness. Our problem and its solutions are symmetric, i.e., invariant under rela-
beling of agents in the following sense: Let v be any multiplier vector, S be any allocation
and π be any permutation of [n]. Let u and T be such that ui = vπ(i) and Ti = Sπ(i). Then
clearly, f(v,S) = f(u,T). The problem and its solutions are also invariant under scaling,
since we have f(βv,S) = β · f(v,S).
The above properties lead us to:
Observation 3. Without loss of generality, every multiplier vector v has non-increasing
entries v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn such that
∑
i vi = 1.
Given a multiplier vector v, let A(v) be the optimal allocation for v and OPT(v) =
f(v,A(v)). Moreover, if f(v,S) ≥ α ·OPT(v) for some α ≤ 1 then the allocation S is said
to be α-optimal or α-approximate for v.
We note a simple property of A(v): Let v be a multiplier vector with v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn.
Let S be any allocation. If T is a permutation of S such that f(T1) ≥ f(T2) ≥ ... ≥ f(Tn),
then f(v,T) ≥ f(v,S). In particular, if S = A(v) then f(S1) ≥ f(S2) ≥ ... ≥ f(Sn).
Finally, we assume the existence of a poly-time black-box algorithm that computes an
α-approximate allocation B(v) for the multiplier vector v. We express the performance
guarantees of our truthful mechanisms in terms of α and other parameters of the problem.
Although the output allocation S of such an algorithm may not obey f(S1) ≥ f(S2) ≥ ... ≥
f(Sn), it is easy to construct a non-decreasing permutation of S which only improves the
objective function value, as discussed above.
Observation 4. Without loss of generality, any allocation S output by the black-box algo-
rithm obeys f(S1) ≥ f(S2) ≥ ... ≥ f(Sn).
Henceforth, we enforce assumptions from Observation 3 and 4.
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Definition 2 (u dominates w). We say that a multiplier vector u dominates w if there
exists an index i such that for k < i, uk ≥ wk and for k ≥ i, uk ≤ wk.
Lemma 13. If u dominates w, then f(u,S) ≥ f(w,S) for any allocation S satisfying
f(S1) ≥ f(S2) ≥ ... ≥ f(Sn).

























Staircase Representation: Suppose we represent a multiplier vector v as a histogram,
which consists of n vertical bars corresponding to v1, ..., vn, in that order from left to right.
Since multiplier vectors have non-increasing components, such a histogram looks like a
staircase descending from left to right (Refer to Figure 2 for an example). We will refer to





Figure 2: The staircase representation of v = (v1, ..., vn).
3.4 Vector-Fitting Mechanisms
Consider the following candidate approach to single parameter combinatorial auctions with
partially public valuations: Fix a set U of some multiplier vectors. Using the black-box
algorithm, compute an α-approximate allocation B(v) for each vector v ∈ U and populate
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the range R = { B(v) : v ∈ U }. Run the maximal-in-range mechanism which given a
multiplier vector v, chooses the allocation S ∈ R that maximizes f(v,S).
Let’s consider the merits and demerits of this mechanism. If the input multiplier vector
happens to be in U , then the mechanism will indeed return an output allocation that is at
least α-approximate. But we have no guarantees otherwise. If U consisted of all possible
vectors, we would have an α-approximate truthful mechanism that could be computationally
infeasible due to the size of U . We handle this trade-off with vector-fitting. The intuition
behind vector-fitting is as follows: If two multiplier vectors u and v are ‘very similar’ to
each other, then B(u) and B(v) should be ‘similar’ as well. In particular, B(u) should be a
reasonably good allocation for v and vice versa.
Our mechanism will be the same as the candidate mechanism outlined above, except
that we will construct the set of vectors U very carefully. For any input vector of multipliers
v, we will guarantee that a reasonably similar vector v′ can be found in U , and hence and
allocation S′ is in the range R with provably large objective value f(v,S′).
3.4.1 A Simple αlnn-factor Mechanism
In this section, we will conduct a warm-up exercise by applying the vector-fitting method
to construct a simple αlnn -factor truthful mechanism. Recall that the vector-fitting method
as outlined in Section 3.4 starts with a set U of multiplier vectors. Our set U is defined as




for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, zero elsewhere
As before, for each v ∈ U , we compute an α-approximate allocation B(v) and populate
the range R with it.
Let v be the input multiplier vector. Let rj =
∑j
k=1 vj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n be the prefix sums




for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, zero elsewhere
It is easy to verify that dj is a valid multiplier vector i.e., it has non-increasing components
















Figure 3: Expressing f(v,S) as horizontal cuts of the staircase.
Let S = A(v) be the optimal allocation for v and T be the allocation returned by our
mechanism. For notational convenience, define vn+1 = 0. We start with OPT(v) = f(v,S)








f(Si) + (vn−1 − vn)
n−1∑
i=1






























































Equation (11) decomposes f(v,S) as the horizontal cuts of the staircase of v (See Figure
3). (12) follows from the previous step by applying Lemma 13 to dj and uj . Equation (13)
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Equation (15) is derived from the previous expression by simply rearranging the terms.













f(v,T) ≥ α ·OPT(v)/ lnn
An example that achieves the bound: We can differentiate each term of the sum-
mation in equation (15) to compute the values of vj for which the term is maximized, so as
to make the bound as loose as possible. Surprisingly, a single multiplier vector maximizes







calculations prove that for this multiplier vector, the summation is indeed Ω(lnn).
3.5 The Main Result
In this section, we will use vector-fitting to obtain a general technique to convert a non-
truthful approximation algorithm for single parameter combinatorial auctions into a truthful
mechanism. This technique yields a range of trade-offs between the approximation factor
and the running time of the algorithm. We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 14. There exists a truthful mechanism for maximizing welfare in a single param-
eter combinatorial auction with partially public valuations that runs in time
O((loga n)logb n·poly(m,n)) and produces an allocation with total welfare at least 3α4ab ·OPT(v)
- where α is the approximation factor of the black-box optimization algorithm and a, b > 1
are parameters of the mechanism.
Setting a = b = 2 we get: (Henceforth, all logarithms are to base 2)
Corollary 15. There exists a 3α16 -factor truthful mechanism running in time
O(nlog logn · poly(m,n)), i.e. quasi-polynomial time.
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Similarly, setting a = 2 and b = log n we get:











and the above corol-






3.5.1 Constructing the Range R
Overview: Recall the staircase representation of a multiplier vector v, such as in Figure 2.
Depending upon the entries of v, the steps of the staircase may have varying heights. We
can construct a discretization of the space of all multiplier vectors by restricting the values
the height of any step can take. That is, we populate the initial set U with all vectors whose
components take values of the form b−k for some constant b > 1 and for all k ≥ 0. Now
given any input vector v, we can find a vector u ∈ U such that ui is at most a multiplicative
factor b away from vi. Thus, u can serve as a vector ‘similar’ to v. We need more complex
machinery to ensure that the size of U does not blow up, and that the vectors in U still have
unit norm.
Let a, b > 1 be suitably chosen parameters of the mechanism. Let Q = { b−k : 0 ≤ k <
logb n } be a set of values discretizing the interval ( 1n , 1] and q be the minimum element of
Q. For a multiplier vi ≥ q, we define bvic to be the largest element of Q that is no greater
than vi. For a multiplier vector v we define the floor of v, bvc as follows:
Definition 3 (Floor bvc). The floor bvc of a multiplier vector v is the vector u constructed
by Algorithm 1.
In short, to find the ‘floor’ of a multiplier vector, we successively round down the ‘large’
components into elements of Q, until we need to set all the remaining components equal
due the monotonicity and unit norm requirement or only ‘small’ components are remaining.
When represented as a staircase (Refer Figure 4), all the steps of bvc except the last one












Figure 4: Vertical fitting of v.
Algorithm 1: ConstructFloor









/* r is the minimum permissible value of ui due to monotonicity. */
if vi ≥ q and bvic > r then
ui ← bvic;
else
for j = i to n do
uj ← r;
break
Observation 5. The floor of a vector v is a valid multiplier vector itself, i.e. it has non-
increasing components and unit l1 norm. Moreover, v dominates bvc.
Proof. The procedure to compute u = bvc easily ensures the unit l1 norm. Now to prove
monotonicity by contradiction, assume that there exists i such that ui < ui+1. Since v








uk = ui +
n∑
k=i
uk = ui + (n− i)ui+1 > (n− i+ 1) · ui
This implies






which is impossible since the right-hand side of the above inequality is the minimum value
ui could have been assigned.
To see that v dominates u = bvc, observe that if the index i does not belong to the
last step of u, then vi must have been rounded down to ui, and therefore, ui ≤ vi. Now
consider the smallest i such that ui > vi. Then i must belong to the last step of u, and
hence uj = ui > vi ≥ vj for any j ≥ i.
Intuitively, the floor of a vector is (in a sense formalized by Lemma 17) ‘similar’ to the
vector, and the similarity is parametrized by b.
Lemma 17. For any multiplier vector v and allocation S, f(bvc,S) ≥ 34b · f(v,S).
Proof. Define u = bvc. Let p be the highest index such that vp is rounded down by the





it is clear that p < n. Now for i ≤ p, we have ui = bvic ≥ vi/b. Consider two cases about
vp+1:
Case 1 - vp+1 ≥ q: In this case, up+1 = r ≥ bvp+1c ≥ vp+1/b. For i ≥ p + 1, we













Case 2 - vp+1 < q: Let h =
p∑
i=1






/f(v,S). From the mono-
tonicity of S, we conclude that
H · f(v,S) =
p∑
i=1
vif(Si) ≥ h · f(v,S)
and hence H ≥ h.
Since ui ≤ vi for all i ≤ p, and both u and v must have unit l1 norm, we have
∑
i>p ui ≥∑
i>p vi = (1−h). Hence, ui ≥
1−h
n for i > p. By definition, vi < q ≤
b
n for i > p. Together,
































· f(v,S) ≥ 3
4b
· f(v,S)
We will construct our preliminary set of vectors U ′ as
U ′ = { u : u = bvc for some multiplier vector v }
It turns out that U ′ is too large for our purposes. Hence we construct a subset U ⊆ U ′,
which is small enough. Referring back to the staircase representation of a multiplier vector
(Figure 4), we constructed U ′ by discretizing the ‘height’ of each step - by fitting the vectors
vertically. Since rounding down the components of v might lead to many components of
u = bvc having the same value, u also looks like a staircase, perhaps with ‘wider’ steps.
Each step of u may have any integral width - at most n.
We construct U from U ′ by further restricting how wide a step can be - by horizontal
fitting (See Figure 5). We allow each step (except the last) to be of width dake for some
integer k ≥ 0 - where a > 1 is a suitably chosen parameter of the mechanism. To this end,
we need to slightly formalize the staircase representation of a multiplier vector, which till
now we only used as a visual aid. By a step of the staircase of v, we will mean a maximal
interval [i1, ..., i2] ⊆ [1, ..., n] such that vi1 = vi2 . All the indices i1 ≤ i ≤ i2 will be said to
belong to the step, whereas i1 and i2 and the first and last indices of the step. The height
of the step is given by vi1 and the width by i2 − i1 + 1.
Remark: Notice that just as a multiplier vector can be specified by the n-tuple (v1, ..., vn),
it can also be identified by specifying the height and width of each step of its staircase rep-
resentation. In fact, specifying all but the last step of a staircase fixes the last step due to
the unit norm requirement.











Figure 5: Horizontal fitting of v.
Definition 4 (Core ←−v ). The core ←−v of a multiplier vector v is the vector u constructed
by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: ConstructCore
i1 ← 1; j1 ← 1;







/(n− j1 + 1);
if vi1 > r then
Find the largest index i2 such that vi1 = vi2 ;
Find largest integer k such that dake ≤ (i2 − j1 + 1);
for i = j1 to j1 + dake − 1 do
ui ← vi1 ;
i1 ← i2 + 1;
j1 ← j1 + dake;
else
for i = j1 to n do
ui ← r;
break
Operation of Algorithm 2: Each iteration of the while loop processes one step of v and
u. i1 and j1 hold the first index of the current step of v and u respectively. r is the minimum
height of the current step of u by monotonicity. If r ≥ vi1 , then the requirement for unit l1
norm forces us to introduce the last step of the staircase of u. Otherwise, [i1, ..., i2] is the
current step of v and we set the width of the current step of u to be dake.
Observation 6. The core of a vector v is a multiplier vector itself, i.e. it has non-increasing
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components and unit l1 norm. Moreover, v dominates ←−v .
Proof. The algorithm to construct u = ←−v itself easily ensures the unit norm. To prove
monotonicity by contradiction, assume that there exists i such that ui < ui+1. This can
only happen is i + 1 is the first index of the last step of u and i is the last index of the







uk = (i− j + 1)ui + (n− i)ui+1 > (n− j + 1) · ui
This means







/(n− j + 1)
which is impossible since the right-hand side of the above inequality is the minimum value
uj could have been assigned.
To see that v dominates u =←−v , observe that if the index i does not belong to the last
step of u, then ui = vj for some j ≥ i, and hence ui = vj ≤ vi. Now consider the smallest i
such that ui > vi. Then i must belong to the last step of u. Therefore, uj = ui > vi ≥ vj
for all j ≥ i.
Lemma 18. For any multiplier vector v and allocation S, f(←−v ,S) ≥ f(v,S)/a.
Proof. Suppose the staircase of v has s1 steps and that of u = ←−v has s2 steps. Then the
following four properties follow directly from the algorithm:
1. s2 ≤ s1
2. For 1 ≤ i < s2, the i’th step of v is at most a times as wide as the i’th step of u and
both have the same height.
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ s2, let i1 and j1 be the first indices of the i’th steps of v and u respectively.
Then i1 ≥ j1.
4. If [j, ..., n] is the last step of u then ui ≥ vi for i ≥ j.
To prove the lemma, we will compare the the contributions of corresponding steps of the
staircases of v and u to the objective functions.
55
For i < s2, let [i1, ..., i2] be the i’th step of v, [j1, ..., j2] be the i’th step of u and



















So the i’th step of v contributes at most a times value to f(v,S) as the i’th step of u
contributes to f(u,S), where i < s2.
Finally by the fourth property, the step s2 of u contributes more to f(u,S) than the
corresponding contribution of steps s2, ..., s1 of v to f(v,S) combined. The result therefore
follows.
We now define our set of vectors U as follows: U = { ←−v : v ∈ U ′ }. We populate
the range R of allocations as R = { B(v) : v ∈ U } where B(v) is the α-approximate
allocation returned by the black box algorithm.
3.5.2 Proof of Theorem 14
We run the following maximal-in-range mechanism: Given an input multiplier vector v we
return the allocation T ∈ R that maximizes f(v,T). We need to prove that f(v,T) ≥
3α
4ab ·OPT(v)
Let S = A(v) be the optimal allocation for v and
←−
bvc be the core of the floor of v.
Combining Lemmas 17 and 18, we conclude that f(
←−
bvc,S) ≥ 34ab ·OPT(v). Since
←−
bvc ∈ U ,
there exists an allocation X ∈ R such that
f(
←−
bvc,X) ≥ α ·OPT(
←−





Since v dominates bvc which in turn dominates
←−
bvc (Refer to Observation 5 and 6),
application of Lemma 13 yields:




Using equations (17) and (18),





The running time of the mechanism is established by Lemma 19, which finishes the proof of
Theorem 14.




Proof. |R| is bounded by |U|. U consists of only those vectors which are cores of floors of
some multiplier vectors. We have seen that each step of the staircase of v ∈ U except the last
must be of width w = dake for some integer k. Moreover, there can be only |Q| = O(logb n)
such steps and at most one of each height. We have also remarked that specifying all but





staircases in U .
3.6 Discussion
As shown in [18, 12], it seems that designing a truthful mechanism with good approximation
factor for maximizing social welfare is a difficult problem. In light of this, our work suggests
an important research direction to pursue in combinatorial auctions- to divide the valuation
function into a part which is common among all the agents and can be estimated by the
auctioneer and a part which is unique and private to individual agents.
Also, it would be interesting to see if for submodular public functions (or even more
specifically, for coverage functions), which have concrete motivation in TV ad auctions, one
can design a constant factor polynomial time truthful mechanism.
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CHAPTER IV
ONLINE VERTEX-WEIGHTED BIPARTITE MATCHING AND
SINGLE-BID BUDGETED ALLOCATIONS
Online bipartite matching is a fundamental problem with numerous applications such as
matching candidates to jobs or boys to girls. More recently, this and related problems have
received significant attention, because they model the allocation aspect of sponsored search
auctions, where multiple agents (advertisers) bid on items (query keywords) which arrive
one by one in an online manner. In this chapter, we look at the following vertex-weighted
version of this problem:
Online vertex-weighted bipartite matching: The input instance is a bipartite
graph G(U, V,E, {bu}u∈U ), with the vertices in U and their weights bu known ahead of time.
Vertices in V arrive one at a time, online, revealing their incident edges. An arriving vertex
can be matched to an unmatched neighbor upon arrival. Matches once made cannot be
revoked later and a vertex left unmatched upon arrival cannot be matched later. The goal
is to maximize the sum of the weights of the matched vertices in U .
When all the weights are equal, this reduces to the classic online bipartite matching prob-





in their seminal work [38].




-competitive randomized algorithm for general
vertex weights. Our solution constitutes the first known generalization of the algorithm
in [38] in this model and provides new insights into the role of randomization in online
allocation problems. It also effectively solves the problem of online budgeted allocations
[47] in the case when an agent makes the same bid for any desired item, even if the bid is
comparable to his budget - complementing the results of [47, 11] which apply when the bids
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are much smaller than the budgets.
4.1 Motivation, Background and Overview of Our Result
Online bipartite matching is a fundamental problem with numerous applications such as
matching candidates to jobs, ads to advertisers, or boys to girls. A canonical result in online
bipartite matching is due to Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani [38], who gave an optimal online
algorithm for the unweighted case to maximize the size of the matching. In their model, we
are given a bipartite graph G(U, V,E). The vertices in U are known ahead of time, while
the vertices in V arrive one at a time online in an arbitrary order. When a vertex in V
arrives, the edges incident to it are revealed and it can be matched to a neighboring vertex
in U that has not already been matched. A match once made cannot be revoked. The goal
is to maximize the number of matched vertices.
However, in many real world scenarios, the value received from matching a vertex might
be different for different vertices: (1) Advertisers in online display ad-campaigns are willing
to pay a fixed amount every time their graphic ad is shown on a website. By specifying their
targeting criteria, they can choose the set of websites they are interested in. Each impression
of an ad can be thought of as matching the impression to the advertiser, collecting revenue
equal to the advertiser’s bid. (2) Consider the sale of an inventory of items such as cars.
Buyers arrive in an online manner looking to purchase one out of a specified set of items
they are interested in. The sale of an item generates revenue equal to the price of the item.
The goal in both these cases is to maximize the total revenue.
Connection to the online budgeted allocation problem: Apart from being a natu-
ral generalization of the online bipartite matching problem, our vertex-weighted matching
problem is closely related to an important class of online problems. Mehta et al [47] con-
sidered the following online version of maximum budgeted allocation problem [24, 45] to
model sponsored search auctions: We have n agents and m items. Each agent i specifies
a monetary budget Bi and a bid bij for each item j. Items arrive online, and must be
immediately allocated to an agent. If a set S of items is allocated to agent i, then the agent
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pays the minimum of Bi and
∑
j∈S bij . The objective is to maximize the total revenue of
the algorithm. An important and unsolved restricted case of this problem is when all the
non-zero bids of an agent are equal, i.e. bij = bi or 0 for all j. This case reduces to our
vertex-weighted matching problem (For a proof, refer to Section 4.5.3).
For the general online budgeted allocation problem, no factor better than 12 is yet known.
This factor is achieved by a simple deterministic greedy algorithm given by Lehmann et al
[45]. The same algorithm also provides factor 12 for online submodular allocation, where
the agents have a general submodular valuation function over the set of items. For visual
representation of the hierarchy of these online allocation problems, refer to Figure 6. The
best known lower bound stands at 1 − 1e due to the hardness result in [38] for the case
when all bids and budgets are equal to 1 - which is equivalent to the unweighted online
matching problem. The small bids case - where bij  Bi for all i and j - was solved
by [47, 11] achieving the optimal 1 − 1e deterministic competitive ratio. It was believed
that handling large bids requires the use of randomization, as in [38]. In particular, many
attempts [43, 8, 27] had been made to simplify the analysis of the randomized algorithm in
[38], but no generalization had been achieved.
Single bids








Figure 6: Hierarchy of related online allocation problems studied in literature.
Our solution to the vertex-weighted matching problem is a significant step in this di-
rection. Our algorithm generalizes that of [38] and provides new insights into the role of
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randomization in these solutions, as outlined in Section 4.1.1. Finally, our algorithm has in-
teresting connections to the solution of [47] for the small bids case - despite the fact that the
vertex-weighted matching problem is neither harder nor easier than the small bids case. This
strongly suggests a possible unified approach to the unrestricted online budgeted allocation
problem. See Section 4.5 for details.
4.1.1 Overview of the Result
Solution to the unweighted case: To describe our result, it is instructive to start at
the unweighted case (bu = 1 for all u ∈ U) and study its solution by [38]. Two natural
approaches that match each arriving v ∈ V to the an unmatched neighbor in U chosen (a)
arbitrarily and (b) randomly, both fail to achieve competitive ratio better than 12 . Their
solution is an elegant randomized algorithm called Ranking that works as follows: it begins
by picking a uniformly random permutation of the vertices in U (called the “ranking” of the
vertices). Then, as a vertex in V arrives, it is matched to the highest-ranked unmatched
neighbor. Surprisingly, this idea of using correlated randomness for all the arriving vertices
achieves the optimal competitive ratio of 1− 1e .
How do we generalize Ranking in presence of unrestricted weights bu? The natural
Greedy algorithm which matches an arriving vertex to the highest-weighted unmatched
neighbor, achieves a competitive ratio of 12 (see Appendix B.1 for a proof). No deterministic
algorithm can do better. While the optimality of Ranking for unweighted matching suggests
choosing random ranking permutations of U , Ranking itself can do as badly as factor 1n
for some weighted instances.
The main challenge in solving this problem is that a good algorithm must follow very
different strategies depending on the weights in the input instance. Greedy and Rank-
ing are both suboptimal for this problem, but both have ideas which are essential to its
solution. In particular, they perform well on distinct classes of inputs, namely, Greedy on
highly skewed weights and Ranking on equal weights. The following observation about
Ranking helps us bridge the gap between these two approaches: Suppose we perturb each
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weight bu identically and independently and then sort the vertices in the order of decreasing
perturbed weights. When all the weights are equal, the resulting order happens to be a
uniformly random permutation of U and thus, Ranking on unweighted instances can be
thought of as Greedy on perturbed weights! We use this insight to construct our solution
to the vertex-weighted matching problem. While the nature of perturbation used did not
matter in the above discussion, we need a very specific perturbation procedure for general
vertex-weights.
Our algorithm is defined below:
Algorithm 3: Perturbed-Greedy
For each u ∈ U , pick a number xu uniformly at random from [0, 1].
Define the function ψ(x) := 1− e−(1−x).
foreach arriving v ∈ V do
Match v to the unmatched neighbor u ∈ U with the highest value of buψ(xu).
Break ties consistently, say by vertex id.
Remarks:
• It is not obvious, and indeed is remarkable in our opinion, that it suffices to perturb
each weight bu completely independently of other weights. The fact that Perturbed-
Greedy achieves the best possible competitive ratio is a post-facto proof that such
independence in perturbations is sufficient. Without the knowledge of our algorithm,
one could reasonably believe that the vector of vertex-weights {bu}u∈U - which is
known offline - contains valuable information which can be exploited. In what follows
we provide intuition as to why this is not the case.
Consider the two input instances in Figure 7. Both the connected components in
G1 have equal weights, and hence we know that Ranking achieves the best possible
competitive ratio on G1. Similarly, both connected components in G2 have highly
skewed weights, suggesting Greedy as the optimal algorithm. On the other hand,
Ranking and Greedy are far from optimal on G2 and G1 respectively. Since two
instances with identical values of vertex-weights require widely differing strategies, this
exercise suggests that we may not be losing must information by perturbing weights
62









U1 V1 U2 V2
Graph G1 Graph G2
Equal weights ⇒ Ranking Skewed weights ⇒ Greedy
Order of arrival Order of arrival
Figure 7: Two instances with the same vertex-weights, but widely differing optimal strate-
gies.
• The particular form of the function ψ is not a pre-conceived choice, but rather an
artifact of our analysis. This combined with the discussion in Section 4.5 seems to
suggest that ψ is the ‘right’ perturbation function.
• We note that we can also choose the function ψ(x) to be 1 − e−x, which keeps the
algorithm and results unchanged.
• Finally, we note that the multipliers yu = ψ(xu) are distributed according to the




. Therefore, we could have equivalently




from the above distribution, and use buyu as the perturbed weight.
Our main result is the following theorem. The second part of the theorem follows from
the optimality of Ranking for unweighted matching [38].
Theorem 20. Perturbed-Greedy achieves a competitive ratio of 1− 1/e for the vertex-
weighted online bipartite matching problem. No (randomized) algorithm has a better com-
petitive ratio.
In addition to the basic idea (from the proof of Ranking) of charging unmatched vertices
in some probabilistic events to matched vertices in other events, our analysis needs to handle
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the new complexity introduced due to the weights on vertices. At a very high level, just like
the algorithm, our analysis also manages to pull together the essence of the analyses of both
Greedy and Ranking.
4.1.2 Related Work
Our problem is a special case of online bipartite matching with edge weights, which has
been studied extensively in the literature. With general edge weights and vertices arriving
in adversarial order, every algorithm can be arbitrarily bad (see Appendix B.2). There are
two ways to get around this hardness: (a) assume that vertices arrive in a random order,
and/or (b) assume some restriction on the edge weights.
When the vertices arrive in random order, it corresponds to a generalization of the
secretary problem to transversal matroids [3]. Dimitrov and Plaxton [15] study a special
case where the weight of an edge (u, v) depends only on the vertex v – this is similar to
the problem we study, except that it assumes a random arrival model (and assumes vertex
weights on the online side). Korula and Pal [42] give an 18 -competitive algorithm for the
problem with general edge weights and for the general secretary problem on transversal
matroids.
If one does not assume random arrival order, every algorithm can be arbitrarily bad
with general edge weights or even with weights on arriving vertices. [37] introduce the
assumption of edge weights coming from a metric space and give an optimal deterministic
algorithm with a competitive factor of 13 . As far as we know, no better randomized algorithm
is known for this problem.
Finally, there has been other recent work [14, 27, 23], although not directly related to
our results, which study online bipartite matching and budgeted allocations in stochastic
arrival settings.
Roadmap: The rest of this section is structured as follows: In Section 4.2 we set up the
preliminaries and provide a warm up analysis of a proof of Ranking in the unweighted




Consider an undirected bipartite graph G(U, V,E). The vertices of U , which we will refer
to as the offline side, are known from the start. We are also given a weight bu for each
vertex u ∈ U . The vertices of V , referred to as the online side, arrive one at a time (in an
arbitrary order). When a vertex v arrives, all the edges incident to it are revealed, and at
this point, the vertex v can be matched to one of its unmatched neighbors (irrevocably) or
left permanently unmatched. The goal is to maximize the sum of the weights of matched
vertices in U .
Let permutation π represent the arrival order of vertices in V and let M be the subset
of matched vertices of U at the end. Then for the input (G, π), the gain of the algorithm,
denoted by ALG(G, π), is
∑
u∈M bu.
We use competitive analysis to analyze the performance of an algorithm. Let M∗(G) be
an optimal (offline) matching, i.e. one that maximizes the total gain for G (note that the
optimal matching depends only on G, and is independent of π), and let OPT(G) be the total
gain achieved by M∗(G). Then the competitive ratio of an algorithm is minG,π
ALG(G,π)
OPT(G) .
Our goal is to devise an online algorithm with a high competitive ratio.
Definition 5 (M∗(G)). For a given G, we will fix a particular optimal matching, and refer
to it as the optimal offline matching M∗(G).
Definition 6 (u∗). Given a G, its optimal offline matching M∗(G) and a u ∈ U that is
matched in M∗(G), we define u∗ ∈ V as its partner in M∗(G).
4.2.2 Warm-up: Analysis of Ranking for Unweighted Online Bipartite Match-
ing
Recall that online bipartite matching is a special case of our problem in which the weight
of each vertex is 1, i.e. bu = 1 for all u ∈ U . [38] gave an elegant randomized algorithm for
this problem and showed that it achieves a competitive ratio of (1 − 1/e) in expectation.
In this section, we will re-prove this classical result as a warm-up for the proof of the main
result. The following proof is based on those presented by [8, 27] previously.
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Algorithm 4: Ranking
Choose a random permutation σ of U uniformly from the space of all permutations.
foreach arriving v ∈ V do
Match v to the unmatched neighbor in u which appears earliest in σ.
Theorem 21 ( [38]). In expectation, the competitive ratio of Ranking is at least 1− 1e .
In this warm-up exercise, we will simplify the analysis by making the following assump-
tions: |U | = |V | = n and G has a perfect matching. These two assumptions imply that
OPT = n and that the optimal matching M∗(G) is a perfect matching.
For any permutation σ, let Ranking(σ) denote the matching produced by Rank-
ing when the randomly chosen permutation happens to be σ. For a permutation σ =
(u1, u2, ..., un) of U , we say that a vertex u = ut has rank σ(u) = t. Consider the random
variable
yσ,i =
 1 If the vertex at rank i in σ is matched by Ranking(σ).0 Otherwise
Definition 7 (Qt, Rt). Qt is defined as the set of all occurrences of matched vertices in the
probability space.
Qt = { (σ, t) : yσ,t = 1 }
Similarly, Rt is defined as the set of all occurrences of unmatched vertices in the probability
space.
Rt = { (σ, t) : yσ,t = 0 }
Let xt be the probability that the vertex at rank t in σ is matched in Ranking(σ), over
the random choice of permutation σ. Then, xt =
|Qt|
n! and 1 − xt =
|Rt|
n! . The expected
gain of the algorithm is ALGG,π =
∑
t xt.
Definition 8 (σiu). For any σ, let σiu be the permutation obtained by removing u from σ
and inserting it back into σ at position i.
Lemma 22. If the vertex u at rank t in σ is unmatched by Ranking(σ), then for every
1 ≤ i ≤ n, u∗ is matched in Ranking(σiu) to a vertex u′ such that σiu(u′) ≤ t.
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Proof. Refer to Lemma 24 in the analysis of Perturbed-Greedy for the proof of a more
general version of this statement.
In other words, for every vertex that remains unmatched in some event in the prob-
ability space, there are many matched vertices in many different events in the space. In
the remaining part of this section, we quantify this effect by bounding 1− xt, which is the
probability that the vertex at rank t in σ (chosen randomly by Ranking) is unmatched, in
terms of some of the xts.
Definition 9 (Charging map f(σ, t)). f is a map from bad events (where vertices remain
unmatched) to good events (where vertices get matched). For each (σ, t) ∈ Rt,
f(σ, t) = {(σiu, s) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, σ(u) = t and Ranking(σiu) matches u∗ to u′ where σiu(u′) = s}
In other words, let u be the vertex at rank t in σ. Then f(σ, t) contains all (σ′, s), such
that σ′ can be obtained from σ by moving u to some position and s is the rank of the vertex
to which u∗, the optimal partner of u, is matched in σ′.






Claim 23. If (ρ, s) ∈ f(σ, t) and (ρ, s) ∈ f(σ, t), then σ = σ.
Proof. Let u′ be the vertex in ρ at rank s. Let u∗ be the vertex to which u′ is matched by































Therefore, the probabilities xt’s obey the equation 1− xt ≤ 1n
∑
s≤t xs for all t. Since
any vertex with rank 1 in any of the random permutations will be matched, x1 = 1. One can









OPT , thereby proving Theorem 21.
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4.3 Proof Of Theorem 20
In this section, we will assume that |U | = |V | = n and that G has a perfect matching. In
Appendix 4.4 we will show how this assumption can be removed.
Recall that our algorithm works as follows: For each u ∈ U , let σ(u) be a number picked
uniformly at random from [0, 1] (and independent of other vertices) Now, when the next
vertex v ∈ V arrives, match it to the available neighbor u with the maximum value of
buψ(σ(u)), where ψ(x) := 1− e−(1−x).
For ease of exposition, we will prove our result for a discrete version of this algorithm.
For every u ∈ U we will choose a random integer σ(u) uniformly from {1, ..., k} where k
is the parameter of discretization. We will also replace the function ψ(x) by its discrete
version ψ(i) = 1−
(
1− 1k
)−(k−i+1). The discrete version of our algorithm also matches each
incoming vertex v ∈ V to the available neighbor u with the maximum value of buψ(σ(u)).
Notice that ψ is a decreasing function, so ψ(s) ≥ ψ(t) if s ≤ t. As k → ∞, the discrete
version tends to our original algorithm.
We begin with some definitions, followed by an overview of the proof.
We will denote by σ ∈ [k]n, the set of these random choices. We will say that u is at
position t in σ if σ(u) = t. As a matter of notation, we will say that position s is lower
(resp. higher) than t if s ≤ t (resp. s ≥ t).
Definition 10 (u is matched in σ). We say that u is matched in σ if our algorithm
matches it when the overall choice of random positions happens to be σ.
Definition 11 (Qt, Rt). Qt is defined as the set of all occurrences of matched vertices in
the probability space.
Qt = {(σ, t, u) : σ(u) = t and u is matched in σ}
Similarly, Rt is defined as the set of all occurrences of unmatched vertices in the probability
space.
Rt = {(σ, t, u) : σ(u) = t and u is not matched in σ}
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The expected gain of the algorithm is ALGG,π =
∑
t xt. Also note that the optimal gain
at any position t is B = OPT(G)k since each vertex in U appears at position t with probability
1/k and is matched in the optimal matching. Therefore,





Definition 12 (σiu). For any σ, σiu ∈ [k]n is obtained from σ by changing the position of u
to i, i.e. σiu(u) = i and σiu(u′) = σ(u′) for all u′ 6= u.
Observation 7. For all (σ, t, u) ∈ Rt and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, our algorithm matches u∗ to some
u′ ∈ U in σiu.
The above observation follows from Lemma 24. We’ll use it to define a map from bad
events to good events as follows.
Definition 13 (Charging Map f(σ, t, u)). For every (σ, t, u) ∈ Rt, define the set-valued
map
f(σ, t, u) = {(σiu, s, u′) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and the algorithm matches u∗ to u′ in σiu where σiu(u′) = s}
Observation 8. If (ρ, s, u′) ∈ f(σ, t, u), then (ρ, s, u′) ∈ Qs.
Now we are ready to give an overview of the proof.
4.3.1 Overview of the proof
The key idea in the analysis of Ranking in Section 4.2.2 was that we can bound the number
of occurrences of unmatched vertices - the bad events - in the entire probability space by a
careful count of the matched vertices - the good events. The charging map f defined above
is an attempt to do this. We’ll show in Lemma 24 that if (σiu, s, u′) ∈ f(σ, t, u), then the
scaled (by ψ) gain due to u′ in σiu is no less than the scaled loss due to u in σ. However, s
may be higher or lower than t, unlike Ranking where s ≤ t. This implies that the bound
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is in terms of events in
⋃
sQs, 1 ≤ s ≤ k, which is very weak (as many of the events in the
union are not used).
One idea is to bound the sum of losses incurred at all positions, thereby using almost all
the events in
⋃
sQs. However, if we do this, then the charging map loses the disjointness
property, i.e. if (σ, t, u) ∈ Rt and (σiu, i, u) ∈ Ri then f value of both these occurrences is the
same. Thus, each event in
⋃
sQs gets charged several times (in fact a non-uniform number
of times), again making the bound weak. To this end, we introduce the idea of marginal
loss (Definition 14), which helps us define a disjoint map and get a tight bound.
Next, we formalize the above.
4.3.2 Formal proof
We begin by proving an analogue of Lemma 22.
Lemma 24. If the vertex u at position t in σ is unmatched by our algorithm, then for every






Proof. Case 1 (i ≥ t): Let v1, ..., vn be the order of arrival of vertices in V . Clearly, v1
will see the same choice of neighbors in σiu as in σ, except the fact that the position of u is
higher in σiu than in σ. Since we did not match v1 to u in σ, v1 will retain its match from σ
even in σiu. Now assuming that v1, ..., vl all match the same vertex in σiu as they did in σ,
vl+1 will see the same choice of neighbors in σiu as in σ with the exception of u. Since vl+1
did not match u in σ either, it will retain the same neighbor in σiu and by induction every
vertex from V , specifically u∗ keeps the same match in σiu as in σ. Since σ(u′) = σiu(u′), we






Case 2 (i < t): For a vertex v ∈ V , let mσ(v) and mσiu(v) be the vertices to which v is
matched in σ and σiu respectively, if such a match exists and null otherwise. Intuitively,
since ψ(i) ≥ ψ(t), the scaling factor of bu only improves in this case, while that of any
other vertex in U remains the same. Therefore, we can expect u to be more likely to be








(v) ≥ ψ (σ (mσ(v))) bmσ(v) to hold for all v ∈ V .
In fact, something more specific is true. The symmetric difference of the two matchings
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produced by the algorithm for σ and σiu is exactly one path starting at u that looks like
(u, v1, mσ(v1), v2, mσ(v2), ...), where (v1, v2, ...) appear in their order of arrival. In what
follows we prove this formally.
Let V ′ = {v ∈ V : mσ(v) 6= mσiu(v)} be the set of vertices in V with different matches
in σ and σiu. Index the members of V ′ as v1, ..., vl in the same order as their arrival, i.e. v1
arrives the earliest. For simplicity, let uj = mσ(vj) and wj = mσiu(vj).
We assert that the following invariant holds for 2 ≤ j ≤ l: Both uj and uj−1 are
unmatched in σiu when vj arrives and vj matches uj−1, i.e. wj = uj−1.
For base case, observe that the choice of neighbors for v1 in σiu is the same as in σ,
except u, which has moved to a lower position. Since by definition v1 does not match u1 in
σiu, w1 = u. Now consider the situation when v2 arrives. All the vertices arriving before v2
- with the exception of v1 - have been matched to the same vertex in σiu as in σ, and v1 has
matched to u, leaving u1 yet unmatched. Let Uσ(v2) and Uσiu(v2) be the sets of unmatched
neighbors of v2 in σ and σiu respectively at the moment when v2 arrives. Then from above
arguments, Uσiu(v2) = (Uσ(v2) ∪ {u1}) − {u}. Since u was unmatched in σ, u2 6= u. Since
v2 ∈ V ′, w2 6= u2. This is only possible if w2 = u1. And hence the base case is true.
Now assume that the statement holds for j−1 and consider the arrival of vj . By induction
hypothesis, v1 has been matched to u and v2, .., vj−1 have been matched to u1, ..., uj−2
respectively. All the other vertices arriving before vj that are not in V ′ have been matched
to the same vertex in σiu as in σ. Therefore, uj−1 is yet unmatched. Let Uσ(vj) and Uσiu(vj)
be the sets of unmatched neighbors of vj in σ and σiu respectively at the moment when
vj arrives. Then from above arguments, Uσiu(vj) = (Uσ(vj) ∪ {uj−1}) − {u}. Since u was
unmatched in σ, uj 6= u. Given that wj 6= uj , the only possibility is wj = uj−1. Hence the
proof of the inductive statement is complete.
If u∗ /∈ V ′ then u′ = mσiu(u
∗) = mσ(u∗) and the statement of the lemma clearly holds





bu′ = ψ(i)bu ≥ ψ(t)bu since
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= ψ (σ(uj)) buj (22)
≥ ψ(t)bu (23)
Equation (21) follows from the fact that u∗ = vj was matched in σiu to uj−1 when uj
was also unmatched. The fact that only u changes its position between σ and σiu leads us
to (22). Finally, equation (23) follows from the fact that u∗ was matched to uj in σ when u
was also unmatched.
Using the above lemma, we get the following easy observation.
Observation 9. For all (σ, t, u) ∈ Rt, 1 ≤ t ≤ k, f(σ, t, u) contains k values.
Remark: As noted in the overview, although Lemma 24 looks very similar to Lemma
22, it is not sufficient to get the result, since the good events pointed to by Lemma 24 are
scattered among all positions 1 ≤ s ≤ k – in contrast to Lemma 22, which pointed to only
lower positions s ≤ t, giving too weak a bound. We try to fix this by combining the losses
from all Rt. However we run into another difficulty in doing so. While for any fixed t, the
maps f(σ, t, u) are disjoint for all (σ, t, u) ∈ Rt, but the maps for two occurrences in different
Rts may not be disjoint. In fact, whenever some u is unmatched in σ at position t, it will
also remain unmatched in σju for j > t, and the sets f(σ, t, u) and f(σju, j, u) will be exactly
the same! This situation is depicted in Figure 8.
Lower
Positions
Positions of u in σ
Marginal
Loss
Positions of u in σiu
f (σ, t, u)
f (σ, t′, u)
(σ, t, u) ∈ St u matched
u unmatched
Figure 8: Marginal Losses
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This absence of disjointness again renders the bound too weak. To fix this, we carefully
select a subset of bad events from
⋃
tRt such that their set-functions are indeed disjoint,
while at the same time, the total gain/loss can be easily expressed in terms of the bad events
in this subset.
Definition 14 (Marginal loss events St). For t > 1, St = {(σ, t, u) ∈ Rt : (σt−1u , t −
1, u) /∈ Rt−1}.
Informally, St consists of marginal losses. If u is unmatched at position t in σ, but
matched at position t− 1 in σt−1u , then (σ, t, u) ∈ St (See Figure 8). The following property
can be proved using the same arguments as in Case 1 in the proof of Lemma 24.
Observation 10. For (σ, t, u) ∈ St, u is matched at i in σiu if and only if i < t.
Definition 15 (Expected Marginal Loss αt).













(B − xt) =
∑
t
(k − t+ 1)αt (26)
Proof. To prove equation (25), we will fix a t and construct a one-to-one map g : Rt →⋃
s≤t St. Given (σ, t, u) ∈ Rt, let i be the lowest position of u such that u remains unmatched
in σiu. By observation 10, i is unique for (σ, t, u). We let g(σ, t, u) = (σiu, i, u). Clearly,
(σiu, i, u) ∈ Si. To prove that the map is one-to-one, suppose (ρ, s, u) = g(σ, t, u) = g(σ, t, u).
Then by definition of g, ρ = σsu = σsu which is only possible if σ = σ. Therefore, |Rt| =⋃
s≤t St.
Lastly, observe that g maps an element of Rt corresponding to the vertex u being un-
matched, to an element of Si corresponding to the same vertex u being unmatched. From
equation (20),














This proves equation (25). Summing (25) for all t, we get (26).
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Now consider the same set-valued map f from Definition 13, but restricted only to the
members of
⋃
t St. We have:
Claim 26. For (σ, t, u) ∈ St and (σ, t, u) ∈ St, if (ρ, s, u′) ∈ f(σ, t, u) and (ρ, s, u′) ∈
f(σ, t, u) then σ = σ, t = t and u = u.
Proof. If u′ is matched to v in ρ then by definition of f , v = u∗ = u∗, implying u = u.
Therefore, ρ = σiu = σiu for some i. But this implies that σ = σ
j
u for some j. This is only
possible for j = t since by definition, if u is unmatched in σ at t, then there exists a unique
i for which (σiu, i, u) ∈
⋃
t St. If j = t, then σ = σ and t = t.
Armed with this disjointness property, we can now prove our main theorem.

















If we add the equation (28) for all (σ, t, u) ∈ St and for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n, then using Claim
































Equation (29) follows from (24) and (19). Equation (30) uses Claim 25.
















When ψ(t) = 1−
(
1− 1k
)k−t+1, observe that ψ(t)+ ∑s≥t ψ(s)k ≥ (k−t+1)k and ∑t ψ(t) = ke




(B − xt) =
∑
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Remark: Observe that we substituted for ψ(t) only after equation (31) - up until that
point, any choice of a non-increasing function ψ would have carried the analysis through. In
fact, the chosen form of ψ is a result of trying to reduce the left hand side of equation (31)
to the expected total loss. To conclude, the ‘right’ perturbation function is dictated by the
analysis and not vice versa.
4.4 Graphs with Imperfect Matchings
In Section 4.3, we proved Theorem 20 for graphs G(U, V,E) such that |U | = |V | and G has
a perfect matching. We can remove these assumptions with just a few modifications to the
definitions and equations involved in the proof. The algorithm remains unchanged, i.e. we
just use Perturbed-Greedy. We will only outline these modifications and the rest of the
proof follows easily. Let M∗(G) be a maximum weight matching in G(U, V,E) and U be
the set of vertices in U matched by M∗(G). Thus we know that OPT(G) =
∑
u∈U bu.
Keeping the definition of Qt the same, we change the definition of Rt to:
Rt = {(σ, t, u) : u ∈ U and σ(u) = t and u is not matched in σ}
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The above redefinition conveys the fact that if a vertex u is not matched by M∗(G),
then we no longer consider u being unmatched a bad event. Consequently, equation (20)
changes to:




which in turn yields following counterpart of equation (25):




Let Eq(t) be the version of (32) for t. We then multiply Eq(t) by ψ(t) − ψ(t + 1) and
sum over 1 ≤ t ≤ n to obtain a combined inequality (with ψ(k + 1) = 0):
∑
t















Equation (33) used the definition of ψ(t) = 1−
(
1− 1k
)(k−t+1). Combining equation (33)





























and ψ(t)− ψ(t+ 1) = (1−ψ(t+1)k → 0 as k →∞.
4.5 Implications of the Result
4.5.1 Finding the optimal distribution over permutations of U
Since Perturbed-Greedy also chooses ranking orders over U through randomization,
we can interpret it as a non-uniform Ranking, where it chooses permutations of U from
the ‘optimal’ distribution. But we could have posed the following question, without the
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knowledge of our algorithm: How do we find an optimal non-uniform distribution over
permutations of U? As a start, let us consider the case of 2 × 2 graphs. By exhaustive
search over all 2 × 2 graphs, we can figure out the best Ranking like algorithm for 2 × 2
graphs (Figure 9 shows the only two potentially ‘hard’ instances in 2 × 2 graphs). This
algorithm picks the permutation (u1, u2) with probability α1+α and the permutation (u2, u1)
with probability 11+α (where α = bu1/bu2), and then proceeds to match to the highest
neighbor. This algorithm gives a factor of α
2+α+1
(α+1)2
, which is minimized at α = 1, giving a













Figure 9: Canonical examples for 2×2 graphs.
An attempt to generalize this idea to larger graphs fails due to a blow-up in complexity.
In general, we need a probability variable pσ for every permutation σ of U . The expected
weight of the matching produced by the algorithm on a graph G, is a linear expression
ALGG(pσ1 , pσ2 , ...). Thus, the optimal distribution over permutations is given by the optimal
solution of a linear program in the pσ variables. But this LP has exponentially many variables
(one per permutation) and constraints (one per “canonical graph instance”). Therefore, our
algorithm can be thought of as solving this extremely large LP through a very simple process.
4.5.2 General capacities / Matching u ∈ U multiple times
Consider the following generalization of the online vertex-weighted bipartite matching prob-
lem: Apart from a weight bu, each vertex u ∈ U has a capacity cu such that u can be
matched to at most cu vertices in V . The capacities allow us to better model ‘budgets’ in
many practical situations, e.g., in online advertising. Our algorithm easily handles general
capacities: For each u ∈ U , make cu copies of u and solve the resulting instance with unit




-approximate in expectation for
the original problem with capacities.
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4.5.3 Online budgeted allocation :- The single bids case vs. the small bids case
As noted earlier, the single bids case of the online budgeted allocation problem reduces to
online vertex-weighted bipartite matching. Let us first define these problems.
Online budgeted allocation: We have n agents and m items. Each agent i speci-
fies a monetary budget Bi and a bid bij for each item j. Items arrive online, and must be
immediately allocated to an agent. If a set S of items is allocated to agent i, then the agent
pays the minimum of Bi and
∑
j∈S bij . The objective is to maximize the total revenue of
the algorithm.
Single bids case: Any bid made by agent i can take only two values: bi or 0. In other
words, all the non-zero bids of an agent are equal.
Corollary 28. Online budgeted allocation with single bids reduces to online vertex-weighted
bipartite matching, and hence Perturbed-Greedy achieves a competitive ratio of 1− 1/e
for this problem.
Proof. Given an instance of online budgeted allocation where agent i has budget Bi and
single bid value bi, we will construct an input instance G(U, V,E, {bu}u∈U ) of online vertex-
weighted bipartite matching. The set V consists of one vertex corresponding to every item.
The set U will contain one or more vertices for every agent.
For every agent i, let ni be the largest integer such that nibi ≤ Bi and let ri = Bi−nibi.
Clearly, ri < bi. We will construct a set Ui of ni vertices, each with weight bi. In addition, if
ri > 0, then we will construct a vertex ūi with weight ri and add it to Ui. For all u ∈ Ui and
v ∈ V , the edge uv ∈ E if and only if agent i makes a non-zero bid on the item corresponding
to v.
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(1) Given a solution to the budgeted allocation problem where a set Si of items is allocated
to agent i, let us see how to construct a solution to the vertex-weighted matching problem
with the same total value.
• If agent i pays a total of |Si| · bi, then we know that |Si| ≤ ni. Hence, for every item
in Si, we will match the corresponding vertex in V to a vertex in Ui − {ūi}. Let Ri
be the set of vertices in Ui thus matched. We have:∑
u∈Ri
bu = |Ri| · bi = |Si| · bi
• If agent i pays a total amount strictly less than |Si| · bi, then we know that: (a)
|Si| ≥ ni + 1, (b) ri > 0 and (3) agent i pays the budget Bi. We can now choose any
ni + 1 items in Si and match the corresponding vertices in V to the ni + 1 vertices in
Ui. The sum of the weights of matched vertices in Ui,
∑
u∈Ui bu = Bi.
Summing over all i, the weight of the matching formed is equal to the total revenue of the
budgeted allocation. Let OPTA and OPTM denote the values of the optimal solutions of
the budgeted allocation and the vertex-weighted matching problems respectively. Then we
conclude from the above discussion that:
OPTM ≥ OPTA (34)
(2) Given a solution to the vertex-weighted matching problem where a set R ⊆ U of vertices
is matched, let us see how to construct a solution to the budgeted allocation problem with
at least the same total value. Let Ri = R∩Ui. For every v ∈ V that is matched to a vertex
in Ri, we will allocate the corresponding item to agent i. Let Si be the set of items allocated
to agent i.
• If |Ri| = |Si| ≤ ni, then agent i pays a total of |Si| · bi and we have:∑
u∈Ri
bu ≤ |Ri| · bi = |Si| · bi







Summing over all i, the total revenue of the budgeted allocation is at least the weight of the
matching. Let ALGM be the expected weight of the vertex-weighted matching constructed
by Perturbed-Greedy and ALGA be the expected value of the budgeted allocation con-














Here, equation (35) follows from the main result - Theorem 20 - and the last step uses
equation (34). This completes our proof.
Connection to the small bids case: Note that the small bids case (bij  Bi) studied in
[47, 11] does not reduce to or from the single bids case. Yet, as it turns out, Perturbed-
Greedy is equivalent to the algorithm of [47] - let us call it MSVV - on instances that
belong to the intersection of the two cases. When every agent has a single small bid value,
the problem corresponds to vertex-weighted matching with large capacities cu for every
vertex u. Recall that we handle capacities on u ∈ U by making cu copies u1, u2, ..., ucu of
u. For each of these copies, we choose a random xui ∈ [0, 1] uniformly and independently.
In expectation, the xui ’s are uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Also observe that
Perturbed-Greedy will match u1, u2, ..., ucu in the increasing order of xui ’s, if at all.
Therefore, at any point in the algorithm, if ui is the unmatched copy of u with smallest xui
(and consequently highest multiplier ψ(xui)) then xui is in expectation equal to the fraction
of the capacity cu used up at that point. But MSVV uses exactly the scaling factor ψ(T )
where T is the fraction of spent budget at any point. We conclude that in expectation,
Perturbed-Greedy tends to MSVV as the capacities grow large, in the single small bids
case.
It is important to see that this phenomenon is not merely a consequence of the common
choice of function ψ. In fact, the function ψ is not a matter of choice at all - it is a by-product
of both analyses (Refer to the remark at the end of Section 4.3). The fact that it happens
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to be the exact same function seems to suggest that ψ is the ‘right’ function. Moreover, the
analyses of the two algorithms do not imply one-another. Our variables are about expected
gains and losses over a probability space, while the algorithm in [47] is purely deterministic.
This smooth ‘interface’ between the seemingly unrelated single bids and small bids cases





Unifying computational and information theoretic hardness: A very interesting av-
enue of future work in light of our comments in Section 2.5.2 is the possibility of a hardness
proof that makes both computational (i.e., based on P 6= NP) and information theoretic
arguments. To our knowledge, no such proof is yet known for any problem. The need
for such a technique is shown by our results for the multi-agent submodular shortest path
problem. Our algorithm for this problem makes only polynomially many oracle calls, but
needs to solve an NP-hard problem in order to match the lower bound! Ostensibly, a stricter
hardness may apply if we also restrict the computational power of our algorithm.
Separation between truthful and non-truthful mechanisms in single parameter
domains: As we mentioned in Chapter 3, for single parameter domains, it is known that
monotone allocation rules characterize the set of all truthful mechanisms. An allocation rule
or algorithm is said to be monotone if the allocation parameter of an agent (f(Si) in our
case) is non-decreasing in his reported bid vi. Unfortunately, often it is the case that good
approximation algorithms known for a given class of valuation functions are not monotonic.
It is an important and well-known open question in algorithmic mechanism design to resolve
whether the design of monotone algorithms is fundamentally harder than the non-monotone
ones. In other words, it is not known if, for single parameter problems, we can always con-
vert any α-approximation algorithm into a truthful mechanism with the same factor. We
believe that our problem is a suitable candidate to attack this question as it gives a lot of
flexibility in defining the complexity of function f .
Towards resolution of the online budgeted allocation problem: In Chapter 4, we
discussed connections between our vertex-weighted matching problem and online budgeted
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allocation. Two pieces of this puzzle are known: The solution to the small bids case by [47]
and our solution to the single bids case. The fact that these pieces fit together, as explained
in Section 4.5.3, is encouraging as it strongly suggests the possibility of a unified solution.
As the authors of [47] explain, the role of the function ψ in their algorithm is to trade-off
the effect of a higher bid with that of a larger remaining budget. On the other hand, we use
the function ψ to choose the appropriate perturbation of bids. It is necessary to reconcile
these two ideas in the unrestricted online budgeted allocation setting.
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APPENDIX A
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS WITH PARTIALLY PUBLIC
VALUATIONS
A.1 Greedy Allocation is Not Truthful
The greedy algorithm in our model works as follows: In each step it assigns one unallocated
item j to a buyer i, where the pair (i, j) is chosen so as maximize the marginal gain in
the objective function. That is, if buyer i had been allocated the set S of items before the
current step, then vi (f(S ∪ {j})− f(S)) is maximized.
We will construct an example that adheres to our formulation of the TV Ad auctions
problem. Consider an instance with two advertisers i1 and i2 and three ad-slots j1, j2, j3.
Suppose there are 10 viewers k1, ..., k10. Viewers k1 to k5 watch slot j1, k6 to k10 watch slot
j2 and k3 to k8 watch slot j3. The public function f in this case is the coverage function:
for a set S of slots f(S) is the number of unique viewers who watch any slot in S. To prove
that the greedy algorithm does not make monotonic allocations in this example, consider
two cases:
1. vi1 = 1 and vi2 = 1 + ε: In the first step, the greedy algorithm assigns the largest
slot j3 (with six viewers) to i2. In the next two steps, it assigns both j1 and j2 to
i1. Therefore, the i1 receives the set {j3} of total allocation value (not counting the
private multiplier) 6.
2. vi1 = 1 and vi2 = 1 − ε: In the first step, the greedy algorithm assigns the largest
slot j3 (with six viewers) to i1. In the next two steps, it assigns both j1 and j2 to i2.
Therefore, the i1 receives the set {j1, j2} of total allocation value (not counting the
private multiplier) 10.
Clearly, i2 receives a larger allocation at a lower private valuation. Therefore, the greedy
algorithm is not monotone.
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APPENDIX B
ONLINE VERTEX-WEIGHTED BIPARTITE MATCHING AND
SINGLE-BID BUDGETED ALLOCATIONS
B.1 Performance of Greedy and Ranking
With non-equal weights, it is clearly preferable to match vertices with larger weight. This
leads to the following natural algorithm.
Algorithm 5: Greedy
foreach arriving v ∈ V do
Match v to the unmatched neighbor in u which maximizes bu (breaking ties
arbitrarily);
It is not hard to show that Greedy achieves a competitive ratio of at least 12 .
Lemma 29. Greedy achieves a competitive ratio of 1/2 in vertex-weighted online bipartite
matching.
Proof. Consider an optimal offline matching, and a vertex u ∈ U that is matched in the
optimal offline matching but not in the greedy algorithm. Now look at a vertex u∗ ∈ V that
is matched to the vertex u in the optimal matching. In Greedy, u∗ must have been matched
to a vertex u′ ∈ U , s.t. bu ≤ bu′ , since u was unmatched when u
∗ was being matched. So
we’ll charge the loss of bu to u
′ . Note that each u′ does not get charged more than once – it
is charged only by the optimal partner of its partner in the algorithm’s matching. Thus the
loss of the algorithm is no more than the value of the matching output by the algorithm.
Hence the claim.
In fact, this factor 1/2 is tight for Greedy as shown by an instance consisting of many
copies of the following gadget on four vertices, with u1, u2 ∈ U and v1, v2 ∈ V . As ε → 0,
the competitive ratio of Greedy tends to 12 .
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Notice that this counter-example relies on weights being roughly equal. We, however,
know that Ranking has an expected competitive ratio of (1 − 1/e) when the weights are
equal. On the other hand, if the weights are very different, i.e. ε is large, in the above
example, then Greedy provides a good competitive ratio. At the same time, if we exchanged
the weights on the two vertices in the example to be bu1 = 1 and bu2 = 1 + ε, then as ε
grows large, the expected competitive ratio of Ranking drops to 12 and on larger examples,
it can be as low as 1n . To summarize, Greedy tends to perform well when the weights are
highly skewed and Ranking performs well when the weights are roughly equal.
B.2 A Lower Bound for Randomized Algorithms with Edge Weights
In this section, we will sketch the proof of a lower bound for the competitive ratio of a
randomized algorithm, when the graph G(U, V,E) has edge weights and our objective is to
find a matching in G with maximum total weight of edges. Previous studies of this problem
have only mentioned that no constant factor can be achieved when the vertices in V arrive
in an online manner. However, we have not been able to find a proof of this lower bound
for randomized algorithms in any literature. We prove the result when the algorithm is
restricted to be scale-free. A scale-free algorithm in this context produces the exact same
matching when all the edge weights are multiplied by the same factor.
Consider a graph G(U, V,E) such that U contains just one vertex u and each vertex in
v ∈ V has an edge to u of weight bv. Fix v1, v2, ... to be the order in which the vertices of V
arrive online. By Yao’s principle, it suffices for us to produce a probability distribution over
bv1 , bv2 , ... such that no deterministic algorithm can perform well in expectation. We will
denote the vector of edge weights in the same order in which the corresponding vertices in
V arrive, i.e. (bv1 , bv2 , ...) and so on. Consider the following n vectors of edge weights: For
every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, bi = (Di, Di+1, ..., Dn, 0, 0, ...) and so on, where D is a sufficiently large
86
number. Suppose our input distribution chooses each one of these n vectors of edge weights
with equal probability.
Clearly, regardless of the vector which is chosen, OPT(G) = Dn. Since an algorithm
is assumed to be scale-free and online, it makes the exact same decisions after the arrival
of first k vertices for each of the edge weight vectors bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Therefore, it cannot
distinguish between b1, ...,bk after just k steps. Hence, we can characterize any algorithm
by the unique k such that it matches the k’th vertex in V with a positive weight edge.
Let ALG be any deterministic algorithm that matches the k’th incoming vertex with





Di. Since D is large, this is at most cnOPT(G), where c is some constant. Applying
Yao’s principle, we conclude that the competitive ratio of the best scale-free randomized
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